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Abstract
Many states in India have time and again elected a multiparty or a coalition government.
Research so far has shown that these differences in political cohesiveness of the ruling polit-
ical entity has influenced the spending choices of the state governments. However, the ev-
idence is not completely conclusive. Different authors have used different measures of po-
litical fragmentation deriving opposite results for their effect on state government spending.
There are also differences in the way economists and political scientists have dealt with the
issue econometrically. This is coupled with a lack of a theoretical model of choice of public
spending under alternative political regimes in the Indian context. I address these gaps in
the literature by first building a theoretical model of spending policies of a state government.
In this model, extensiveness and intensity of credit constraints influences equilibrium voting
policies and hence the spending policies of governments in power. The resulting predictions
are then comprehensively tested using data on seventeen Indian states over the period of
twenty years. The econometric analysis provides substantive evidence for the importance of
political factors in determining government spending. Specifically, I find that that politically
less cohesive governments tend to spend more on education and less on agriculture than their
more cohesive counterparts. There is also some evidence on electoral cycles in health expen-
diture and that having a BJP or a Congress government reduces social expenditure. Further,
the analysis supports the model’s underlying notion of credit constrained voters determin-
ing the spending policies of the government via the degree of political cohesiveness of the
government in power.
JEL Codes: E62, H72.
Keywords: political economy, government spending, credit constraints and voting, differ-
entiated election platforms, coalition governments in India.
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1. Introduction
Many states in India have time and again elected a multiparty or a coalition government. Ac-
cording to Lalvani (2005), India went through 43 episodes of coalition governments during the
period 1966-67 to 1998-99. Given that much of the policy making in a democratic country hap-
pens in the political realm, the degree of political cohesion of a government can be argued to
be influential in deciding the level and composition of spending. The empirical analysis so far
does confirm this, though the results are not completely robust. These studies use different
econometric methods and employ different ways of measuring political cohesion but some-
times reach contradictory answers. In addition, most of these studies use datasets that are long
panels and the debate over an appropriate econometric or statistical method to analyze them
is not yet settled. There is also a lack of a theoretical model backing such empirical analysis.
In this paper, I attempt to fill these gaps in the literature by developing a model of government
spending conditional on political cohesion and then testing the resulting predictions with data
on seventeen Indian states spanning twenty years using a variety of econometric methods to
ensure robustness of results. In addition to these contributions, because state government
spending contributes significantly to the fiscal burden of the Indian central government, this
paper also sheds some light on the political underpinnings of the conduct of fiscal as well as
monetary policy. In this sense, the analysis in this paper concerns itself with the fiscal aspects
of the Leviathan monetary policy dealt with in Waknis (2011).
The empirical analysis so far has shown that coalition governments do spend differently
than single party governments. Specifically, two out of three studies cited below show that
coalition governments spend more on education than the single party governments. Various
reasons have been conjectured for this behaviour including a heterogenous constituency or
higher visibility of certain category of voters over others, etc. A more interesting reason from
the macroeconomic perspective has been suggested by Saez and Sinha (2009). They posit a
Polanyi mechanism at work causing this differentiated spending patterns. Karl Polanyi 1, while
writing about the transition from traditional economies to more market based ones, suggested
that market pressures may lead to more demands for protection and insurance. This certainly
makes sense in the case of developing countries like India where substantial economic and so-
cial inequities continue to coexist with impressive economic growth.
This is not just a conjecture but something that seems to be borne out by data. For example,
Ghate et al. (2011), who document the properties of Indian business cycles, show that private
consumption in India continues to be more volatile than GDP in the post reform period. This
1First published in 1944, Polanyi (2001) is an analytical account of the transformation of traditional economies em-
bedded with social norms to modern individual centered market based systems. Although the book primarily talks
about the European economies before and after the Industrial revolution, the analysis can be argued to be relevant to
today’s many transition and emerging economies including India.
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clearly indicates presence of credit constraints. How do people respond to such circumstances?
How do they smooth consumption when they lack access to insurance-social or otherwise-in
the presence of increased fluctuations in economic activity? One answer to this question, is
the use of voting power to secure government spending on the required public goods. In India
we see this happening through political responses like cash based relief programs, improved
water supply and sanitation facilities, mid day meal schemes for kids, etc. There are few stud-
ies that seem to support this conjecture about interaction between politicians and voters. For
example, Tandon (2007) uses the tariff reforms of 1990 to show that politicians respond to the
differential impact of the reforms and that such policies significantly affect the voting response.
Thachil (2011) argues that provision of social services by grassroots affiliates has benefitted BJP
of the votes from poor. He studies the rise of BJP and its relation to the work of its sister orga-
nizations in Chattisgarh, India. Rath (July 28, 2012) ascribes increased political fragmentation
to neglected provision of basic services under planning in the post second plan period. Cole
et al. (2008) show that politicians or governments respond to weather shocks and this in turn
affects the voter’s response to the incumbent governments. I capture such responsiveness of
government spending to the consumption smoothing needs of credit constrained voters in a
parsimonious theory of state spending conditional on the type of government.
The model includes an endowment economy where some of the agents are credit con-
strained. Presence of aggregate shocks to endowments and credit constraints means that more
and more people would need to rely on some insurance mechanism or support to smooth con-
sumption. Government expenditure on local public goods like education, health and irrigation
could be an example of such expenditure. In the model, political parties contesting elections
float differentiated election platforms prior to the realisation of shocks. The national party con-
tests the election based on an ideological platform, while the coalition of national and regional
parties does so on an economic policy based platform. In an ideologically determined spend-
ing agenda, the focus is on expenditure which may not may not address specific needs of the
voters. However, an economic policy based platform explicitly focusses on local public goods
requirements of voters. The preferences of voters are such that differentiated platforms sur-
vive in equilibrium and voters are not indifferent between them unlike in a Downsian model.
Agents vote after the realisation of shocks to smooth consumption. A negative shock ensures
that majority of voters become credit constrained and vote for a coalition government. A pos-
itive shock would imply the opposite. I assume that once elected, the respective party imple-
ments its advertised spending policies. Thus, there is no commitment problem regarding policy
implementation.
I look at this model as a preliminary attempt to theoretically motivate an empirical analysis
of state expenditure in India. A richer model capturing complete dynamics of elections in a gen-
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eral equilibrium setting is certainly possible and even desirable in some contexts but beyond
the scope of this paper. Given the caveat, it is worth noting that the theory delivers clear predic-
tions not only about the relationship between degree of political cohesiveness and government
spending but also about the emergence of a certain type of government in the first place. I test
the predictions of the model against the expenditure data of 17 Indian states for the period of
20 years. Accordingly, along with additional interesting results on other expenditure categories,
I find substantial evidence that a higher degree of political fragmentation is associated with a
higher spending on education.
Thus, this paper not only offers a theory of government spending conditional on degree
of political cohesiveness but also provides a clearer and comprehensive econometric analysis
of state spending in India. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out
the model. Section 3 presents the econometric analysis of expenditure patterns of the state
governments based on the predictions of the model. Section 4 looks at the question of what
determines the likelihood of having a coalition government. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
Consider an endowment economy populated with a continuum of agents. At the start of every
period agents receive an endowment ωit. There is borrowing and lending in the economy. A
part of the endowment has to be used as a collateral for borrowing in the credit market. There is
inequality in the initial endowment distribution and hence some of the agents might be credit
constrained. The economy is subject to aggregate shocks on endowments. Let ω¯ be the level of
endowment, which divides the agents into being credit constrained and not credit constrained.
A negative shock shifts the initial distribution of endowments more to the left of ω¯ increasing
the number of credit constrained agents in the population and positive shock has the opposite
effect. However, at any given point the distribution of either agents is never degenerate. These
changes in initial endowments affect the distribution of voter preferences to be discussed be-
low. The state of endowments is always verifiable.
2.1. Agents
All Agents are risk averse and altruistic. After receiving the endowment (ei1) at the beginning of
the period, agents face aggregate shocks that affect them differentially depending on severity
of their credit constraints. Let the probability where an agent’s endowment could be destroyed
be ψ and the extent of destruction be (0 ≤ d ≤ 1). This makes (1 − ψ) as the probability the
endowment could stay at the pre shock level. Non credit constrained agents enter the credit
market and trade to smooth consumption. Credit constrained voters depend on availability
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of local public goods for consumption smoothing. Production of the public goods is financed
by a distortionary tax on the non-credit constrained agents. Examples of typical local pub-
lic goods would be improved schools, introduction of meal schemes in the schools, improved
health access,etc. These are visible and easily targetable expenditures and hence could be used
for smoothing consumption by credit constrained agents.
Agents seek to optimise the expected value of life time consumption, where the expectation
is conditioned on the distribution of shocks. Agents cannot enter into any contract before the
realisation of shocks and hence there is no private insurance market. The distribution of shocks
has the same properties as the preference shocks described in the subsection that follows.
Agents solve the following problem as an economic entity:
W˜ (ei,Ψ) = max
t=∞∑
t=0
Etβ
iu(cit) (1)
where,
cit = ψde
i
t(1− τt) + (1− ψ)eit(1− τt) +RBt−1 (2)
RBit−1 ≤ (eit − cit) (3)
where, Bt is the number of bonds in period t and R is the price of bonds in the credit market.
τ is a distortionary tax on non-credit constrained agents and transfer for the credit constrained
agents. The expectation is over the distribution of shocks.
Agents who enter the credit market buy and sell bonds at the price R. Agents behave com-
petitively in this market and hence take R as given. Because borrowing needs collateral, the
maximum an agent can borrow is given by the available endowment minus consumption , i.e.,
RBt−1 ≤ (eit − cit). Thus, credit constrained consumers will have positive net transfers and no
bonds, while non credit constrained voters will have bonds and taxes/negative net transfers in
their budget constraint. We could understand the agents in this economy as those in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997)- farmers and gatherers. Post shock some farmers need to go to the credit mar-
ket but only few are left with any land to use as collateral in the credit market. The remaining
become almost or completely landless losing access to the credit market.
Agents as voters care about ideology as well as economic policy. Having certain ideology
would mean having specific preferences about social and economic justice and caring about
the economic policy would imply caring about what kind of public goods are provided by us-
ing taxes. Accordingly, credit constrained voters would care about economic policy more than
ideology and vice versa.
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2.2. Political Aspects
There are two entities contesting an election, S andM , to form a government at the state level. S
refers to a single party with a national presence andM to a coalition of regional and/or national
parties. The single party has an ideologically motivated election platform and the coalition has
one promising provision of local public goods. Let fj ∈ F be the fixed characteristic of entity
j and aj ∈ A be the policy variable that the entities are free to choose. I will assume that fS is
being expert in national issues and politics and fM as having expertise in assessing local public
goods requirements. The policies that these parties choose will be aS and aM . I will assume that
the objective of both the political entities is to maximize the probability of winning.
Usually in Downsian style models with or without probabilistic voting, we get a result of pol-
icy convergence. In equilibrium, the competing candidates or parties choose the same policies
and voters become indifferent between candidates (see Persson and Tabellini (2002) for details).
However, in this model we would expect differentiated platforms in equilibrium and voters to
be not indifferent between candidates. This approximates the reality where candidates rarely
choose similar platforms and voters certainly seem to favour one candidate over other (Krasa
and Polborn (2010)).
There have been two ways in which such divergence has been achieved in theory. One way
is to assume limited information on candidates in a Downsian setup and the other provided
by Krasa and Polborn (2009) and Krasa and Polborn (2010). In the former paper, the authors
specify conditions under which one could have a divergence and in the later they develop a
model with multidimensional policy and a binary policy model which is capable of having con-
vergence as well as divergence under clearly defined conditions. In what follows, we adapt
the model and an example economy from Krasa and Polborn (2009) to illustrate the choice of
spending conditional on type of government.
Uncertainty about voter preferences is described by a probability space (Ω,D, µ): A state
ω ∈ Ω determines voters preferences over F × A, and µ is the probability distribution of these
preference shocks, whileD is the set of measurable events. The preference shocks basically act
as a counterpart to the distribution of endowments shocks.
Given these shocks, voters can be differentiated on the basis of their preferences as follows:
Type S (fS , aS)  (fM , aM )  (fS , aM )  (fM , aS)
Type M (fM , aM )  (fS , aS)  (fM , aS)  (fS , aM )
The above preference ranking means that a particular type of voter prefers the candidate of
the particular characteristic and would like him or her to implement a policy consistent with his
or her type. This is an example of what Krasa and Polborn (2009) call non-Uniform Candidate
Ranking preferences.
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Definition 1. Preferences on F ×A are said to satisfy uniform candidate ranking if for all fo, f1 ∈
F and all a, a′ ∈ A, (f0, a)  (f1, a) if and only if (f0, a′)  (f1, a′).
Models in Downsian tradition with candidates without fixed characteristics satisfy UCR and
that leads to similar policies being implemented in equilibrium. However, voter preferences
here are non-UCR. Type S voters would primarily be not credit constrained and Type M voters
be credit constrained. Though, there might be a certain number of voters who definitely belong
to either of the groups, post shock realisation there are some voters who migrate to opposite
groups depending on if they become credit constrained or not(swing voters).
The timing of the political game is as follows:
Stage 1 The two political entities S and M announce their policy platforms aj ∈ A. A mixed
strategy by political entity J = (S,M) consists of probability distribution σj over A.
Stage 2 State ω ∈ Ω is realized and each citizen votes for his preferred political entity, or ab-
stains if indifferent.
2.3. Policy Platform Equilibrium
The above description of the game and voter preferences imply that policy platforms will not
converge in equilibrium. The following proposition states this formally.
Proposition 1. (Policy Platform Equilibrium): (aS , aM ) is the Nash Equilibrium of the political
game.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let PS(ω, aS , aM ) be the winning probability for the political entity
S and PM (ω, aS , aM ) for the political entity R. Note that PS(ω, aS , aM ) = 1 − PM (ω, aS , aM ).
Given the non-UCR voter preferences, PS(ω, aS , aM ) ≥ PS(ω, a′S , aM ) for a′S 6= aS and same
holds true for PM (ω, aS , aM ). This is because voters rank the entity implementing policy in
accordance with its expertise higher than an entity implementing a policy not in accordance
with its expertise (See the preference description above). Thus, the non-UCR preferences imply
that there is no profitable unilateral deviation for either political entities ensuring (aS , aM ) is
the Nash Equilibrium of the political game. QED.
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2.4. Voting equilibrium and Voting Rules
Definition 2. A voting equilibrium for this economy is a list of allocations of endowments, debt
and consumption of credit constrained and non credit constrained agents such that 1)Proposition
1 holds 2)agents maximise the utility given the distribution of shocks and the budget constraint
and 3)given the credit limit based on the initial value of the endowment, the price of bonds clears
the credit markets.
We use the above definition of voting equilibrium to derive the equilibrium voting rules. Let
the optimal life time consumption implied when the distribution of shocks is degenerate be C˜i
and W (e¯) be the associated indirect utility function. We can think of this level of consumption
as something like permanent consumption for an agent or consumption associated with some
linear combination of e¯. Given this, the voters will populate either groups (credit constrained or
not credit constrained) depending on the following decision rules derived from the comparison
of optimisation problem and the definition of the voting equilibrium.
Proposition 2. (Utility Maximisation and Voting Rules): Given the description so far, the voters’
maximisation problem implies the following decision rules for voting:
V b =

M if W˜ (ei,Ψ) < W (e¯i)
S if W˜ (ei,Ψ) ≥W (e¯i)
(4)
V nb =

S if W˜ (ei,Ψ) < W (e¯i)
S if W˜ (ei,Ψ) ≥W (e¯i)
(5)
where V b and V nb are voters types who are credit constrained and not credit constrained respec-
tively.
Proof of Proposition 2. If there were no shocks, then given the endowments the agents would
solve the utility maximisation problem for the optimal choice of consumption every period.
Such choice would depend on the endowment and hence would change from individual to
individual. A shortfall from such an optimal choice (C¯i) would not matter for the voters who are
not credit constrained and hence they will vote based on ideology rather than economic policy.
However, credit constrained voters will have to vote depending on how their consumption in
presence of shocks compares to their C¯i. A short fall means that they become dependent on
government expenditure to smooth consumption and therefore will vote based on economic
policy than ideology. QED.
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Given the definitions and proposition about policy platform equilibrium and voting equi-
librium above it is clear that a coalition government in this model emerges if majority of voters
become borrowing constrained as a result of a negative income shock. Accordingly, the follow-
ing will hold about the nature of government in equilibrium:
Proposition 3. (Stochastic Political Equilibrium):
1. With probability ψ, there would be a coalition government of one national party and one
or more regional parties. The spending policy implemented will include higher expenditure
on the local public goods targeted at the member regional party’s constituency.
2. With probability (1 − ψ) there will be a single party government and the spending policy
implemented would be according to the ideologically motivated election platform of the
national party in office.
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows from Proposition 1 that the type of government is condi-
tional on the type of shocks realised. If the shocks are positive, we have a majority vote for a
single party government and if the shocks are negative, the majority vote goes to coalition of
regional parties. This emphasizes the role of credit constrained voters as swing voters and that
the probability of having a single party or coalition government depends on the probability of
type of shock. Note that a positive probability for shocks implies that the presence of swing
voters (credit constrained or not depending on shocks) and ensures that each type of voter
group could end up as pivotal. Because we assume that the policies are implemented and in
equilibrium the parties contesting elections choose differentiated policies, the nature of actual
spending depends on who is in power.
QED.
Once the type of government is determined based on the probability of shocks and existence
of credit constrained voters, the spending policies are implemented by whichever political en-
tity is voted into power. If a coalition government is voted to power then we can expect the
spending on local public goods like education and healthcare access to go up. If a single party
government comes to power then spending policies will reflect the ideological preferences than
being responsive to local public goods needs. In the empirical analysis that follows we test these
implications of Propositions 1, 2 and 3. We test for differences in spending patterns conditional
on the type of government as well as what affects the probability of having a particular type of
government in the first place.
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3. Econometric Analysis of the Spending Patterns
In this section we test the implications of Proposition 3, using data on 17 Indian states for the
period of 1980-2000. This paper is definitely not the first attempt to do so. There have been
other studies on this issue, as mentioned above. However, they are not without problems.
Chaudhuri and Dasgupta (2006) and Lalvani (2005) use different measures of political fragmen-
tation and come to contradictory results in terms of education spending as well as current and
capital account spending. Saez and Sinha (2009) seems to be a more definitive analysis com-
pared to these two studies. They improve on the earlier studies by including various measures
of political fragmentation and confirm that coalition governments spend more on education.
Though, this makes the tally in favour of positive effect of political fragmentation on educa-
tion spending 2 versus 1, there are several counts on which even their analysis seems incom-
plete. First, they use only one econometric methodology to do so and hence do not provide the
required robustness for the results. This constitutes a valid criticism because of the nature of
data set being analyzed. Secondly, even though being econometrically more sophisticated than
the other two papers, it does not control for GDP at all. It only has state fixed effects. As much as
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important, controlling for obvious differences is es-
sential for a complete understanding of the underlying economic processes. The econometric
analysis in this paper proposes to address these issues by using per capita state GDP as an addi-
tional control along with multiple regression specifications. Accordingly, I analyse expenditure
on education, health, irrigation, agriculture and social services.
3.1. Data
I primarily use a data set (POLEX) created and maintained by Saez (2008) . It includes data
on state expenditure under various heads and data on various political variables on 17 Indian
states. The coverage in POLEX is limited to the states for whom data is consistently available
for the period 1980-2000. It does not contain the state GDP data, though. The data on per
capita state GDP at constant prices for the states was calculated from the series available in the
Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy maintained by the Reserve Bank of India on line and
then incorporated in the POLEX data set to create the one used for analysis in this paper. The
summary statistics for the resulting data set are given in Table (1):
3.2. Econometric Issues
Because of the nature of the data and smaller N and T (17 and 20 respectively) the question of
appropriate econometric method becomes pertinent. The usual panel data methods favoured
by the economists have been developed to address the cases where N > T . Beck (2006) argues
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Table 1: Summary of Variables
State Per Capita GDP Education Health Social Agriculture Irrigation effectvt effectst CDratio
Andhra Pradesh 6662.84 18.264 6.3125 3.316 6.783 7.3285 2.8 1.9915 32.4978
Assam 5460.19 25.8605 6.377 1.9375 11.4495 1.9815 5.2655 2.9565 61.5465
Bihar 3145.78 24.4385 5.895 3.472 8.011 3.779 6.183 3.4445 34.7095
Gujrat 9404.51 20.224 5.816 1.667 6.937 9.6025 3.1185 2.0445 55.0277
Haryana 10223.8 15.5685 5.155 3.5665 7.581 8.1905 4.487 2.7565 73.3609
Himachal Pradesh 7505.66 19.6385 7.691 2.073 16.4135 1.24 2.636 1.795 35.3415
Jammu & Kashmir 6480.39 16.13 7.4985 2.6135 10.591 2.3975 4.9945 2.2825 38.464
Karnataka 7107.17 19.7775 6.293 3.3315 10.182 7.439 3.5005 2.282 76.525
Kerala 7129.52 27.06 7.005 2.8 8.6885 1.05595 6.8255 5.7835 .
Maharashtra 10229.7 20.0055 6.232 1.6635 11.9315 7.404 4.9375 3.4265 71.9998
Madhya Pradesh 6065.22 17.674 6.615 2.6955 13.621 4.046 3.001 1.913 59.9699
Orrissa 4756.72 20.311 6.559 2.6775 10.52 4.356 3.014 1.797 70.9443
Punjab 11566.9 18.9305 6.3055 1.8785 6.006 4.829 3.633 2.4935 47.1225
Rajasthan 6183.35 21.589 7.367 1.2935 6.8685 7.6395 3.522 2.4185 59.6567
Tamil Nadu 8010.15 20.494 7.225 3.8055 11.017 2.3765 3.9325 2.1195 90.149
Uttar Pradesh 4836.89 20.1135 6.591 2.0915 7.674 7.029 4.7625 2.8865 39.5631
West Bengal 6380.27 23.3415 7.944 2.4625 7.3315 3.0605 3.282 2.31 44.1505
Total 7126.41 20.5541 6.64009 2.54971 9.50624 4.92676 4.11147 2.62947 55.6893
Expenditure as percent of total government expenditure. Source: POLEX and Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy
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that in cases of N < T , it may not be appropriate to use the panel data methods, while describ-
ing a body of statistical methods(Time series-Cross Section(TSCS) methods) used by political
scientists to study the political determinants of economic outcomes and policies in case of such
datasets. Saez and Sinha (2009) above follow these methods. A standard modelling practice un-
der this methodology is to use a fixed effect model with panel corrected standard errors and a
lagged dependent variable to account for dynamics.
Studies based on such data sets are not limited to political science, however. Daron Ace-
moglu and his coauthors have used such data sets in a series of papers. For example, Acemoglu
et al. (2008) looks at the geographic and political determinants of economic outcomes and Ace-
moglu et al. (2002)) at relationship between income and democracy. Much of this analysis is
in the mean regression framework and the data is in the TSCS form. Alexander et al. (2011,)
use a similar dataset as in Acemoglu et al. (2008) to demonstrate that a quantile regression can
in fact do a better job to explain the interaction of whole distribution of economic variables
and political outcomes. Though, they do not contradict the findings in later, Alexander et al.
(2011,) demonstrate that the nature of relationship between income and democracy shows sig-
nificant sensitivity to income levels and disproportionately so to country specific effects. Their
basic argument for using quantile regression is thus, that it allows heterogenous marginal ef-
fects across the conditional distribution and that it affords random coefficient interpretation
allowing for slope heterogeneity arising out of non-Gaussian distributions2.
The debate is far from settled and hence in this paper, we follow the TSCS consensus method-
ology, usual panel data methods often preferred by economists as well as the quantile regression
approach to analyse the effect of political cohesiveness on state government spending in India.
In a separate subsection we also analyse the issue of what determines the probability that a
state government has a given type of government. All this analysis is guided by the theoretical
predictions of the model in the earlier section above. Use of multiple methods and specifica-
tions to test the hypothesis about effect of type of government on expenditure on local public
goods serves as built in robustness check for the results.
3.3. Political Parties
Given that much of the analysis that follows concentrates on political variables, this section
describes the players in Indian state level politics briefly. The national parties of India include
the Indian National Congress (INC), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP),
Bharatiya Janata Dal (BJD), Communist Party of India Marxist (CPIM), and Communist Party of
India Marxist-Leninist (CPIML). In addition to these national parties there are parties that are
dominant in the state (regional parties). For example, Shivsena in Maharashtra, Telgu Desam
2According to the authors, the distributions of two commonly used numerical measures of democracy is bimodal.
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Party in Andhra Pradesh, Trinamul Congress in West Bengal, etc. At times, a state is ruled only
by a state party or an alliance centered around either the INC or BJP. Such an alliance would
imply a coalition government in the concerned state. The variable Left in the following analysis
would either refer to CPIM or CPIML or some alliance centered around these parties.
The Indian National Congress played a very important role during India’s independence and
continues to be one of the dominant parties in the period after. Much of the socialist policies
implemented after independence could be attributed to the Congress. India not only saw a
rising dominance of government in the economy through industrial licensing and a significant
public sector under its rule but also went through a brief period of emergency under Prime
Minster Indira Gandhi during 1970s. Through successive Prime Minsters starting from Rajiv
Gandhi in 1980, Congress heralded several market based reforms in late 1980s and early 1990’s.
The balance of payment crisis of 1991 only made such reforms necessary rather than a political
choice. The current Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was the Finance Minster during the
crisis and oversaw the initial reforms.
The BJP had been around in some form or other since independence but rose to promi-
nence only around 1990s. The main reason for its rise was the Ramjanmabhoomi movement
targeted at the majority Hindu population. Its right wing Hindu revivalist ideology has enabled
it to come to the power a couple of times in the center and many more times in the states. It
continues to be the main opposition force to the current ruling Congress party and its allies at
the center.
The regional parties seem to have organized under several political platforms like linguistic
based one or anchored in region specific political social history like the Shiv Sena in Maharash-
tra or Telgu Desam in Andhra Pradesh mentioned earlier. In general specific socio-economic
and political conditions within the states seem to give rise to such parties.
3.4. Regression Specifications
As mentioned earlier, a somewhat standard practice under the TSCS methodology is to use
a fixed effects model with panel corrected standard errors and lagged dependent variable to
account for dynamics (Bartels (n.d.)). TSCS data sets are also referred to as the ‘long panel’, with
the name ‘short panel’ reserved for N > T case. Cameron and Trivedi (2010) state that when
T > N it is necessary to specify a model for serial correlation in the error. They suggest that the
best estimator in this case is to use pooled feasible generalised least squares estimator (PFGLS)
with a distinct AR(1) process for error in each state. However, if T is not much larger than N ,
then it could lead to a finite sample bias and then it is advisable to at least use the errors still
panel corrected but for only panel level heterogeneity. To see how sensitive the estimates are
to various error processes, I run the pooled fixed effects model using various error specification
SUB-NATIONAL SPENDING IN INDIA 13
process.
Further, keeping in lines with the suggestion of Cameron and Trivedi (2010), I assume an
AR1 process for the error term, while running the panel data fixed effects and random effects
regressions. The command xtregar is used to run these regressions (STATA (n.d.)). Following
Alexander et al. (2011,), I run quantile regression on 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of education
and health expenditure data conditional on the state GDP data. A detailed description of the
results under quantile regression is given in a separate section below.
Given the considerable number of specifications implemented and estimated for various
expenditure categories, one has to use some rule to conclusively determine if a particular vari-
able is a significant predictor of the given expenditure category. Accordingly, if a particular
explanatory variable is statistically significant for the given expenditure category in majority of
the specifications, then I deem it as a robust specification. However, I do not distinguish or
categorise the significance based on the power of the significance. In order to give a clearer
picture of methodology implemented, I have included all the estimations regarding education
expenditure in the main body of the paper. A similar estimation exercise is conducted for other
expenditure categories and the summary of results is included towards the end of next section.
The detailed results and graphs are available in the appendix.
3.5. Results
In the analysis that follows the presence of a coalition or political fragmentation in general is
captured by a coalition dummy variable and two index numbers capturing effective number
of parties according to votes and seats(effectvt and effectst) respectively. A higher numeric
value for these indices signifies lower degree of political cohesiveness. As a variable capturing
the effect of political fragmentation in general, these indices seem to be more reliable than the
coalition dummy.
Given this, the most robust results from all the analysis is about the relationship between
education expenditure and the degree of political cohesiveness. From tables (2) and (3), we
can see that the a lower degree of political cohesiveness as measured by effective number of
parties has an unambiguous positive and significant effect on education spending under all the
specifications.
I repeat similar exercise for other expenditure categories and the detailed results are given in
the appendix. The degree of political cohesiveness as measured by effective number of parties
or the coalition dummy does not have any effect on health expenditure under any regression
specifications. However, in all regressions but one, the variable election is significant and neg-
atively related with health expenditure. This suggests that not only there are political cycles in
health spending but it does not seem to be a politically beneficial category of spending. Quan-
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Table 2: Education Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.572 -0.572 -0.445 -0.523 -0.445 -0.304∗
(0.357) (0.338) (0.303) (0.280) (0.311) (0.119)
left 0.524 0.524 0.355 0.411 0.355 0.299
(0.526) (0.622) (0.547) (0.482) (0.460) (0.177)
bjp -0.0734 -0.0734 -0.0883 -0.109 -0.0883 -0.193
(0.457) (0.386) (0.351) (0.352) (0.401) (0.107)
congress 0.292 0.292 0.213 0.226 0.213 -0.0149
(0.374) (0.347) (0.319) (0.307) (0.329) (0.109)
regional -0.321 -0.321 -0.266 -0.308 -0.266 -0.320∗
(0.420) (0.427) (0.381) (0.374) (0.367) (0.149)
coalitio 0.234 0.234 0.199 0.179 0.199 0.146
(0.324) (0.369) (0.330) (0.330) (0.286) (0.108)
election 0.118 0.118 0.0812 0.123 0.0812 -0.0303
(0.262) (0.288) (0.300) (0.261) (0.264) (0.0795)
effectvt 0.216∗ 0.216∗ 0.179∗ 0.218∗∗ 0.179∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.0860) (0.0888) (0.0779) (0.0776) (0.0749) (0.0390)
margin 0.00408 0.00408 0.00369 -0.00137 0.00369 0.00675
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.00461)
alternat -0.339 -0.339 -0.342 -0.325 -0.342 -0.283∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.229) (0.208) (0.186) (0.207) (0.0632)
L.education 0.775∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0499) (0.0448) (0.0460) (0.0322) (0.0194)
Constant 8.669∗ 8.669∗∗ 6.812∗ 7.762∗∗ 6.812∗ 5.301∗∗∗
(3.395) (3.228) (2.875) (2.677) (2.961) (1.144)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.741 0.741 0.796 0.944
chi2 888.9 713.2 1018.3 967.4 1244.4 8370.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Education Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.735∗ -0.735∗ -0.589 -0.653∗ -0.589 -0.435∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.342) (0.312) (0.307) (0.319) (0.123)
left 0.378 0.378 0.247 0.359 0.247 0.214
(0.525) (0.625) (0.555) (0.486) (0.465) (0.163)
bjp -0.120 -0.120 -0.131 -0.134 -0.131 -0.224∗
(0.456) (0.378) (0.348) (0.354) (0.405) (0.102)
congress 0.234 0.234 0.171 0.190 0.171 -0.0428
(0.373) (0.341) (0.315) (0.301) (0.333) (0.108)
regional -0.266 -0.266 -0.223 -0.288 -0.223 -0.271
(0.416) (0.418) (0.377) (0.370) (0.369) (0.142)
coalitio -0.00417 -0.00417 0.0269 0.00374 0.0269 -0.0800
(0.362) (0.400) (0.361) (0.361) (0.324) (0.122)
election 0.127 0.127 0.0887 0.140 0.0887 -0.00366
(0.262) (0.283) (0.294) (0.258) (0.263) (0.0731)
effectst 0.383∗∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.307∗ 0.334∗∗ 0.307∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.135) (0.120) (0.116) (0.125) (0.0614)
margin 0.00683 0.00683 0.00593 0.0000604 0.00593 0.00833
(0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.00485)
alternat -0.336 -0.336 -0.342 -0.306 -0.342 -0.272∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.228) (0.210) (0.189) (0.210) (0.0604)
L.education 0.760∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0379) (0.0525) (0.0477) (0.0482) (0.0340) (0.0216)
Constant 10.37∗∗ 10.37∗∗ 8.380∗∗ 9.322∗∗ 8.380∗∗ 6.720∗∗∗
(3.411) (3.282) (2.981) (2.913) (3.021) (1.205)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.742 0.742 0.790 0.937
chi2 893.0 795.1 1054.7 942.3 1208.0 8583.6
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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tile regressions also suggest that states with higher per capita GDP tend to spend less on health
than states with lower per capita GDP.
For social expenditure, under all regression specifications except the panel data ones, BJP
has a negative and significant effect. I find similar effect of Congress as well.
For irrigation expenditure, the results vary a lot according to specifications used. Hence, it
is difficult to say anything conclusively. The expenditure on agriculture is negatively affected by
the variable ‘alternate’ suggesting an anti incumbency effect. Having a low degree of political
cohesiveness also has a negative effect on agricultural expenditure under TSCS and panel data
specifications.
3.5.1. State GDP and Lagged Dependent Variable
Saez and Sinha (2009) do not control for per capita state real GDP in their analysis. Tables (4)
and (5) show a comparative analysis for the TSCS specification and Table (6) gives the analysis
under panel data specifications. The analysis for the other expenditure categories is given in
the appendix.
I find that overall per capita real GDP is almost always significant. However, note that its co-
efficient has a semi-elasticity interpretation as we used log transformed per capita GDP figures
as a regressor. Additionally, we also find that inclusion of lagged dependent variable as a re-
gressor reduces the coefficient on degree of political cohesiveness. This suggests some history
dependence in all the expenditure categories and when the given regression does not account
for it, the impact is absorbed by degree of political cohesiveness. For panel data regressions, the
indices capturing degree of political fragmentation are significant only under random effects
(columns 3 and 4 from Table (6)) specification suggesting that the unobserved state character-
istics relevant for political fragmentation may not be time invariant.
One could potentially include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor in the panel data
regressions as well. But doing so, complicates the estimation process substantially because of
endogeneity issues. A way out is to use Arellano-Bond kind of an estimator, but this estimator
was developed for short panels where the number of individuals on which we have observations
are substantially greater than the time periods. There have been some simulation studies that
have shown that application of this estimator to long panels type data leads to significant bias
in estimation (Baltagi (2008)). Hence, I do not run regressions of these expenditures on their
lagged values under panel data fixed and random effects estimation.
3.5.2. Quantile Regression
A quantile regression is a good way of understanding the partial effect of an explanatory variable
on various segments of a population (Wooldridge (2011)). Thus, running such a regression gives
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Table 4: Education Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 1.455 0.130 1.772∗ 0.359
(0.825) (0.461) (0.812) (0.486)
bjp -0.967 -0.404 -0.222 -0.134
(0.553) (0.319) (0.607) (0.354)
congress -0.0999 0.0518 0.169 0.190
(0.493) (0.287) (0.510) (0.301)
regional -1.683∗ -0.475 -1.374 -0.288
(0.753) (0.365) (0.743) (0.370)
coalitio 0.0339 0.0613 -0.0219 0.00374
(0.551) (0.359) (0.539) (0.361)
election 0.141 0.133 0.130 0.140
(0.206) (0.265) (0.208) (0.258)
effectst 0.501 0.259∗ 0.741∗∗ 0.334∗∗
(0.262) (0.106) (0.229) (0.116)
margin -0.00494 0.00217 -0.0140 0.0000604
(0.0213) (0.0115) (0.0215) (0.0112)
alternat -0.408 -0.404∗ -0.391 -0.306
(0.323) (0.187) (0.335) (0.189)
L.education 0.819∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.0464) (0.0482)
lnpcsgdp -2.290∗∗∗ -0.653∗
(0.674) (0.307)
Constant 19.84∗∗∗ 3.245∗∗∗ 39.33∗∗∗ 9.322∗∗
(0.860) (0.867) (5.731) (2.913)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.848 0.921 0.864 0.937
chi2 28.72 985.0 51.54 942.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Education Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 1.728∗ 0.202 1.882∗ 0.411
(0.730) (0.457) (0.736) (0.482)
bjp -1.042 -0.363 -0.388 -0.109
(0.532) (0.307) (0.603) (0.352)
congress -0.0576 0.0905 0.0867 0.226
(0.473) (0.288) (0.503) (0.307)
regional -1.585∗ -0.480 -1.497∗ -0.308
(0.768) (0.372) (0.756) (0.374)
coalitio 0.428 0.164 0.403 0.179
(0.506) (0.327) (0.492) (0.330)
election 0.0900 0.124 0.0762 0.123
(0.209) (0.267) (0.211) (0.261)
effectvt 0.444∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.474∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.184) (0.0752) (0.178) (0.0776)
margin -0.00455 0.000267 -0.0112 -0.00137
(0.0207) (0.0110) (0.0211) (0.0107)
alternat -0.550 -0.400∗ -0.506 -0.325
(0.335) (0.183) (0.349) (0.186)
L.education 0.828∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0460)
lnpcsgdp -2.124∗∗ -0.523
(0.665) (0.280)
Constant 19.52∗∗∗ 2.938∗∗∗ 38.04∗∗∗ 7.762∗∗
(0.793) (0.844) (5.877) (2.677)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.881 0.931 0.899 0.944
chi2 37.83 968.0 67.11 967.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Education Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
edu regar1 edu regar2 edu regar3 edu regar4
lnpcsgdp -1.568 -1.550 -2.343∗∗ -2.326∗∗
(1.059) (1.045) (0.828) (0.808)
left -1.751 -1.781 0.0867 -0.0469
(1.138) (1.138) (0.941) (0.937)
bjp -0.554 -0.503 -0.368 -0.347
(0.784) (0.778) (0.744) (0.738)
congress -0.297 -0.236 0.0359 0.131
(0.586) (0.584) (0.557) (0.554)
regional -1.569 -1.507 -1.659∗ -1.482∗
(0.810) (0.802) (0.748) (0.739)
election 0.136 0.154 0.0894 0.127
(0.203) (0.203) (0.205) (0.205)
coalitio -0.129 -0.288 0.136 -0.280
(0.469) (0.504) (0.458) (0.496)
effectvt 0.185 0.370∗
(0.202) (0.174)
margin -0.0301 -0.0285 -0.0260 -0.0193
(0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0203) (0.0205)
alternat -0.390 -0.345 -0.365 -0.261
(0.357) (0.349) (0.335) (0.329)
effectst 0.294 0.746∗∗
(0.299) (0.254)
Constant 34.86∗∗∗ 34.65∗∗∗ 40.58∗∗∗ 39.85∗∗∗
(4.476) (4.520) (7.283) (7.138)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 27.07 33.08
F 1.426 1.487
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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us yet another way of understanding the differences in spending patterns conditional on the
state’s per capita income. It allows us to see if the given category of spending is sensitive to
where the state lies in the spending hierarchy. The substantial regional inequality in India only
underscores the need to look at such variation in spending patterns. The complete tables are in
the appendix and the results are summarised here.
One has to interpret the coefficients in such regressions noting the fact that quantile coeffi-
cients refer to effects on distributions and not on individuals (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p.281).
For example, if having less political cohesiveness affects the spending negatively in a particular
quantile, it means that the states with lower political cohesiveness in that quantile would expe-
rience a decline in spending than states in the same quantile but having higher cohesiveness. It
does not mean that a particular state with income in the given quantile is going to experience a
decline in spending.
For the regression of education expenditure, the variable ‘left’ is a significant and positive
predictor under all the quantiles and so are the two measures of political cohesiveness. The
coefficients jump as we go from the lowest quantile to the middle one and then drops a little
bit suggesting a inverted ‘U’ relationship. Degree of political cohesiveness as measured by ef-
fective number of parties according to seats has a uniform effect on education spending but a
somewhat inverted ‘U’ according to vote share. Per capita state GDP is a significant negative
predictor and the effect intensifies as you go up higher in quantiles.
For the regression of health expenditure, variables, ‘left’ and per capita state GDP are signif-
icant and positive and negative predictors respectively. Only one of the measures of political
cohesiveness, ‘effectvt’ is negatively related to the health expenditure across quantiles. Lower
cohesiveness means a decrease in health care spending. However, for none of the quantiles
dealt with here, election is a significant variable.
For irrigation expenditure, there is evidence that presence of a regional party in the govern-
ment leads to an increase in this expenditure. A Congress party government is also negatively
associated with health expenditure and so is the coalition dummy. Both Congress and BJP gov-
ernments are negatively associated with social expenditure. This was true under the TSCS re-
gressions as well. Political cohesiveness as measured by vote share is negatively associated with
agricultural expenditure across all quantiles. The variable ’margin’ however is positively asso-
ciated with expenditure on agriculture. This suggests that larger the difference in votes of the
largest recipient and the second largest one, higher would be the expenditure on agriculture.
Under quantile regressions, a graphical view is more effective to see how the coefficients on
regressors behave across quantiles. For example, in case of education expenditure regressions
the coefficient on ‘effectvt’ jumps a bit from the lowest quantile to the higher quantile (graph
in third row and first column). This suggests a higher impact of political cohesiveness in states
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Table 7: Education Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edu OLS edu qreg 25 edu qreg 50 edu qreg 75 edu bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -3.305∗∗∗ -2.853∗∗∗ -3.257∗∗∗ -2.872∗∗∗ -3.257∗∗∗
(-6.63) (-4.28) (-5.64) (-4.52) (-4.89)
left 4.247∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗ 4.447∗∗∗ 3.450∗∗∗ 4.447∗∗∗
(5.68) (4.48) (5.21) (3.41) (6.94)
bjp 0.653 0.0779 0.533 1.139 0.533
(0.94) (0.09) (0.66) (1.29) (0.67)
congress 1.578∗∗ -0.0320 0.856 2.300∗∗ 0.856
(2.83) (-0.05) (1.33) (2.87) (1.43)
regional -0.442 -2.308∗∗ -0.821 1.137 -0.821
(-0.69) (-3.03) (-1.11) (1.30) (-1.04)
election 0.149 0.203 0.200 0.126 0.200
(0.37) (0.40) (0.43) (0.23) (0.47)
coalitio 1.226∗ 0.0200 0.125 0.715 0.125
(2.48) (0.03) (0.22) (1.05) (0.21)
effectvt 0.662∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗
(5.20) (2.67) (6.27) (6.51) (4.82)
margin 0.00847 0.0382 0.0177 -0.0124 0.0177
(0.43) (1.60) (0.77) (-0.40) (0.68)
alternat 0.176 0.456 0.319 -0.464 0.319
(0.51) (1.07) (0.79) (-0.95) (0.85)
Constant 45.34∗∗∗ 41.29∗∗∗ 44.21∗∗∗ 41.91∗∗∗ 44.21∗∗∗
(10.33) (7.03) (8.71) (7.66) (7.73)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 8: Education Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
edu psarcor edu qreg 25 edu qreg 50 edu qreg 75 edu bsqreg 50
left 0.130 2.517∗∗ 3.457∗∗∗ 3.331∗∗∗ 3.457∗∗
(0.28) (3.11) (3.37) (3.80) (3.08)
bjp -0.404 0.175 0.660 0.596 0.660
(-1.27) (0.23) (0.70) (0.80) (0.85)
congress 0.0518 -0.632 0.914 1.510∗ 0.914
(0.18) (-1.08) (1.21) (2.37) (1.67)
regional -0.475 -2.520∗∗∗ -0.704 1.159 -0.704
(-1.30) (-3.69) (-0.82) (1.70) (-1.11)
coalitio 0.0613 -1.816∗∗∗ -0.990 0.220 -0.990
(0.17) (-3.49) (-1.32) (0.33) (-1.36)
election 0.133 0.173 0.105 0.0480 0.105
(0.50) (0.39) (0.19) (0.10) (0.23)
effectst 0.259∗ 1.534∗∗∗ 1.601∗∗∗ 1.559∗∗∗ 1.601∗∗∗
(2.44) (9.01) (6.05) (6.72) (6.57)
margin 0.00217 0.0673∗∗ 0.0262 -0.0163 0.0262
(0.19) (3.31) (0.97) (-0.66) (1.13)
alternat -0.404∗ 0.502 0.413 0.564 0.413
(-2.16) (1.38) (0.87) (1.43) (1.07)
L.education 0.819∗∗∗
(17.65)
lnpcsgdp -2.895∗∗∗ -3.653∗∗∗ -4.074∗∗∗ -3.653∗∗∗
(-5.38) (-5.42) (-7.81) (-6.01)
Constant 3.245∗∗∗ 39.96∗∗∗ 47.34∗∗∗ 52.61∗∗∗ 47.34∗∗∗
(3.74) (8.46) (8.09) (11.62) (9.12)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Behaviour of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of
education expenditure
with higher spending levels. The following figure shows the effect for all the quantiles for the
regression of education expenditure and similar figures are included for other expenditure cat-
egories in the appendix. The coefficient on ‘left’ shows a dip at higher levels of expenditure for
irrigation expenditure, signifying its lower influence in higher spending states. It remains fairly
constant for health expenditure across quantiles suggesting that the left’s influence is not sensi-
tive to the level of this category of state spending. However, the effect of political cohesiveness
as measured by vote share has a negative effect and its intensity increases as we move to higher
quantiles. For agriculture expenditure, ‘margin’ has a positive effect mostly for mid range quan-
tiles than at the tails. For social expenditure, the intensity of the negative effect of a BJP party
government intensifies as we move to higher quantiles.
One reason why education might be looked at favourably than other variables is that it could
be shown to be more lumpy and visible. Saez and Sinha (2009) argue this to be the case be-
cause of anti incumbency bias creating additional political uncertainty. Secondly, because of
clear increasing returns to education in a liberalised economy, demand for increased resources
devoted to it makes sense from the voters point of view. Given this, it can be argued that by
subjecting spending on education to discretionary changes more than other variables, politi-
cal parties are simply maximising the probability of reelection. The theoretical model above
implied that presence of credit constrained voters facing amplified aggregate risks would give
rise to coalition governments and lead to specific spending outcomes. The econometric anal-
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ysis above does lend some substantive support to the predictions of the model. A summary of
regression results is given in Table (9).
Table 9: Summary of TSCS-Panel Data and Quantile Regressions
Expenditure Category TSCS-Panel Data Quantile
Education Low Political Cohesiveness (+) Low Political Cohesiveness (+), Left (+)
Health Election (+) Left (+), Per Capita SGDP (-), Low Polit-
ical Cohesiveness (vote share) (-)
Irrigation Inconclusive Regional Party (-), Congress (-), Coali-
tion Dummy (-)
Social Expenditure Congress, BJP (Except Panel,( -)) Congress, BJP (-)
Agriculture Low Political Cohesiveness (-), Alternate (+), Margin (+), Low Political Cohesiveness
(vote share) (-)
4. Likelihood of a Coalition Government
The theoretical model above is in the tradition of microfounded models in economics. It pro-
poses that in an equilibrium a certain type of government emerges to solve agents’ optimisation
problem. This is not to say that agents in real world only have economic motives behind vot-
ing or they are only self interested. The model only tries to capture some economic motivation
behind the observed variation in political cohesiveness. Having said this, it would be interest-
ing to take this motivation to the data and analyse the factors that determine the probability
of a certain type of government emerging as a result of voting. In this section, we use binary
response models to do so.
Two economic factors proposed to influence voting in an economy by the model were en-
dowment shocks and credit constraints. We use the data on number of branch offices of na-
tionalised banks in a state and the credit deposit ratio as proxies for credit constraints. We also
use per capita GDP at 2000 prices as a control variable for state’s income and population pro-
file. There are several ways of estimating a binary response model for panel data. We estimate
the effect of these three variables on the likelihood of having a coalition government for a state
following various specifications as described in Wooldridge (2011) .
It is clear from Table (10), that none of the variables are statistically significant affecting
the probability of a coalition government. However, except per capita state GDP, the other two
variables have the expected sign. Higher number of per capita banks and a higher credit deposit
ratio, both signify reduction in credit constraints and therefore reduce the probability of having
a coalition government. Assuming that lower credit constraints go hand in hand with higher per
capita incomes, one can argue that its effect is captured in the other two variables. Accordingly
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Table 10: Liklihood of having a coalition government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logitfe1 logitre1 logitpa1 probitre1 probitpa1 xtgee1 ols1
main
lnpcsgdp 1.809 1.059 0.519 0.532 0.328 0.107 -0.0242
(0.993) (0.822) (0.566) (0.464) (0.326) (0.0922) (0.0644)
pcbanks -26753.9 -10109.6 -5448.5 -5103.2 -3347.7 -822.6 -16.53
(24293.9) (15326.9) (9220.6) (8655.4) (5461.5) (1600.2) (838.4)
CD-ratio -0.0190 -0.0245 -0.0209 -0.0144 -0.0116 -0.00314 -0.00261∗
(0.0187) (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.00842) (0.00646) (0.00169) (0.00115)
Constant -9.281 -4.432 -4.687 -2.857 -0.504 0.559
(7.264) (4.995) (4.083) (2.877) (0.811) (0.546)
lnsig2u
Constant 1.039 -0.125
(0.607) (0.581)
Observations 220 320 320 320 320 320 320
ll -97.72 -138.6 -138.2 -158.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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we run the following regression with only number of banks per capita and credit deposit ratio.
The results are given in Table (11).
Table 11: Liklihood of having a coalition government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
logitfe1 logitre1 logitpa1 probitre1 probitpa1 xtgee1 ols1
main
pcbanks -14713.0 -3912.8 -2840.4 -2015.0 -1650.9 -284.8 -115.4
(23098.5) (13753.6) (8744.8) (7869.6) (5164.2) (1491.9) (794.9)
CD-ratio -0.0347∗ -0.0289∗ -0.0231∗ -0.0165∗ -0.0123 -0.00346∗ -0.00266∗
(0.0169) (0.0145) (0.0117) (0.00822) (0.00638) (0.00165) (0.00114)
Constant -0.115 0.0420 -0.0935 -0.0628 0.413∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗
(1.358) (0.867) (0.774) (0.514) (0.149) (0.0862)
lnsig2u
Constant 0.894 -0.235
(0.598) (0.574)
Observations 220 320 320 320 320 320 320
ll -99.40 -139.5 -138.9 -158.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dropping per capita state GDP as a regressor does not change the sign of the other two re-
gressors (Table (11)). Further, in all but one specification, credit deposit ratio is a statistically
significant predictor of the change in the probability of having a coalition government. Higher
the credit deposit ratio (lower the credit constraints), lower is the probability of having a coali-
tion government in a given state. This clearly lends some significant support to the message of
the model above that credit constraints do play an important role in determining the degree of
political cohesiveness of a state government.
Along with the issue of statistical significance, among the various specifications above, which
ones would be appropriate to depend on? Table (12) provides information that answers this
question. The mean and the standard deviations are the same across these models. It is diffi-
cult to interpret models which have a negative mean and predict probability values outside the
[0, 1] interval. The random effects logit and the probit models seem to have both these char-
acteristics. On the other hand, the fixed effects logit, Generalised Estimating equations (GEE)
and OLS estimates have a mean and range both in [0, 1] interval. We could argue that the results
from these models are therefore more reliable than from the others.
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Table 12: Prediction summary of the binary response regressions
Variable Observations Mean Standard Dev. Min Max
Coalition 340 0.2471 0.4319 0 1
logitfe 320 0.05 0.0164 0.0111409 0.1099649
logitre 320 -2.010975 0.5857492 -3.497808 -0.6031956
logitpa 320 0.19949 0.0706421 0.0663225 0.4138539
probitre 320 -1.162138 0.3337106 -2.015521 -0.327044
probitpa 320 -0.1997806 0.0667124 0.0666815 0.3934107
xtgee 320 0.2 0.0690014 0.0200332 0.3552062
ols 320 0.2 0.053353 0.0680852 0.3078046
5. Comments and Conclusion
The importance of credit constraints and negative aggregate shocks cannot be overstated given
the recent financial crisis and the recession that follwed. In this paper, I explore the role such
factors can play in determining political outcomes and how these political outcomes in turn
can affect the economic ones. I do so by developing a simple model of two period endowment
economy with some of the agents being credit constrained and shocks making the distribution
of such agents endogenous. These agents seek to smooth consumption and use government
expenditure as an insurance mechanism to survive the shocks. They do so by voting for a polit-
ical entity which promises and has expertise in delivering the required public goods. We show
that different types of governments and therefore different spending policies could emerge in
equilibrium conditional on the realisation of shocks. Thus, this microfounded model builds on
the interaction between economic and political factors to derive testable implications of the
type of government on it’s spending policies.
The empirical analysis does lend support to the predictions of the model. Specifically, there
exists a strong evidence suggesting that a lower degree of political cohesiveness is associated
with higher spending on education. A little less robust (true for fewer specifications than for
education expenditure) is the result that it is also associated with lower spending on agriculture.
We do not find similar evidence for its influence on other spending categories of irrigation and
social services. In these cases, other political factors like presence of a particular political party
in the government or upcoming elections have a significant influence. Specifically for social
expenditure, we found that a BJP or a Congress government always has a negative impact. These
results are obtained using variety of specifications and methodologies and hence have a built
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in robustness check. It does remain a question worthy of exploration as to why politically less
cohesive governments choose spending on education for political maneuvering. We posit that
suitability of education expenditure to specifically target certain groups of voters explains the
preference. However, a more disaggregate analysis covering a lengthier time period might shed
more light on this issue. Use of quantile regression clearly shows that relationship between
spending and political cohesiveness is also sensitive to distribution of spending across states.
For example, in case of education, we find that states with higher level of spending are more
sensitive to degree of political cohesiveness than with the lower ones.
One of the implications of the model is that credit constraints interact with shocks to de-
termine equilibrium voting strategies of the agents. We take this issue to the data and ask how
influential these economic factors are in determining the probability of having a coalition gov-
ernment. The results support this hypothesis of the model. The econometric analysis suggests
that higher the credit constraints (as measured by lower credit deposit ratio), higher is the prob-
ability of having a coalition government. This result should be taken with a pinch of salt as
credit-deposit ratio is only a crude indicator of credit constraints. Commenting on the recent
move towards increasing access to banking in India, Kamath et al. (2010) find that having a bank
account does not necessarily mean an easier access to credit from banks, but having assets like
land certainly do. A more richer analysis, therefore, should include data on asset distribution
and changes in landholding patterns over the years in different states. However, such a time
series data for different states in India is relatively harder to come by.
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the data availability, the theoretical and em-
pirical exercise in this paper signifies a contribution to the literature on political economy and
macroeconomics. Its focus on interaction between credit constraints, aggregate shocks and
voting is based on the intuition that consumption smoothing should drive political decisions
of the agents lacking access to formal insurance mechanisms in order to survive shocks to the
economic activity. However, we do assume that there are no credibility issues involved when it
comes to implementing the promised policies. As a future extension of this research one could
explore the implications of relaxing this assumption.
SUB-NATIONAL SPENDING IN INDIA 29
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “Reversal Of Fortune: Geography
And Institutions In The Making Of The Modern World Income Distribution,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, November 2002, 117 (4), 1231–1294.
, , , and Pierre Yared, “Income and Democracy,” American Economic Review, June 2008,
98 (3), 808–42.
Alexander, Marcus, Matthew Harding, and Carlos Lamarche, “Quantile Regression for Time-
Series-Cross-Section Data,” International Journal of Statistics and Management System,
2011,, Vol. 6, No. 12, pp. 4772.
Angrist, Joshua D and Jorn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics- An Empriricists
Companion, Princeton University Press, 2009.
Baltagi, Badi, Econometrics Analysis of Panel Data, Wiley, 2008.
Bartels, Brandon L., “Beyond fixed versus random effects: A Framework for improving substan-
titve and statistical analysis of panel, time series-cross sectional, AND multilevel data.”
Beck, Natheneil, “Time Series- Cross Section Methods,” Technical Report, Department of Poli-
tics, New York University 2006.
Cameron, A Colin and Pravin K Trivedi, Microeconometrics Using Stata, STATA Press, 2010.
Chaudhuri, Kausik and Sugato Dasgupta, “The political determinants of fiscal policies in the
states of India: An empirical investigation,” The Journal of Development Studies, May 2006,
42 (4), 640–661.
Cole, Shawn A., Andrew J. Healy, and Eric Werker, “Do Voters Appreciate Responsive Govern-
ments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief,” SSRN eLibrary, 2008.
Ghate, Chetan, Radhika Pandey, and Ila Patnaik, “Has India emerged? Business cycle facts from
a transitioning economy,” Working Papers 11/88, National Institute of Public Finance and
Policy April 2011.
Kamath, Rajlakshmi, Mukherjee Arnab, and Maria Sandstrom, “Accessing Institutional Finance:
A Demand Side Story of Rurual India,” Economic and Political Weekly, 2010, XLV, No. 37.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhira and John Moore, “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, 1997, Vol.
105, No. 2, pp. 211–248.
SUB-NATIONAL SPENDING IN INDIA 30
Krasa, Stefan and Mattias Polborn, “Political Competition between Differentiated Candidates,”
CESifo Working Paper Series 2560, CESifo Group Munich 2009.
and , “The binary policy model,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145 (2), 661 – 688.
Lalvani, Mala, “Coalition Governments: Fiscal Implication for the Indian Economy,” American
Review of Political Economy, 2005, Vol. 3(1), 127–163.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, Political economics: explaining economic policy Zeuthen lecture
book series, MIT Press, 2002.
Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation 2001.
Rath, Neelakanth, “Economic Origin of Regional and Caste Parties,” Economic and Political
Weekly, July 28, 2012, Vol - XLVII No. 30.
Saez, Lawrence, “Political cycles, political institutions, and public service expenditure in India
(POLEX-India) data set, version 2008.1,” 2008.
and Aseema Sinha, “Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public Expenditure in India,
1980-2000,” British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
STATA, Release 12 Longitudinal Data/ Panel Data.
Tandon, Sharad, “Economic Reform, Voting, and Local Political Intervention,” Technical Re-
port, University of California, Berkeley 2007.
Thachil, Tariq, “Embedded Mobilization: Nonstate Service Provision as Electoral Strategy in
India.,” World Politics, 2011, 63.3, 434–469.
Waknis, Parag, “Endogenous Monetary Policy: A Leviathan Central Bank in a Lagos-Wright
Economy,” Working papers 2011-20, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
October 2011.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The MIT Press, 2011.
SUB-NATIONAL SPENDING IN INDIA 31
A
SUB-NATIONAL SPENDING IN INDIA 32
A1. Description of variables in the regressions: Source: Saez and Sinha
(2009)
Effective number of Parties (seats) The effective number of parties in a state assem-
bly in India, using seats (nSEATS), was calculated
employing the widely used Laakso and Taageperas
Index (N).
Effective number of Parties (votes) The effective number of parties in a state assem-
bly in India, using votes (nVOTES), was calculated
employing the widely used Laakso and Taageperas
Index (N).
Election Dummy variable taking value 0 or 1
Left Dummy variable taking value 0 if a leftist party is
not part of the government and 1 if it is.
BJP Dummy variable taking value 0 if Bharatiya Janata
Party is not part of the government and 1 if it is.
Congress Dummy variable taking value 0 if Congress is not
part of the government and 1 if it is.
Regional Dummy variable taking value 0 if a regional is not
part of the government and 1 if it is.
Coalition Dummy variable taking value 0 if state government
is not formed by coalition of parties and 1 if it is.
Alternation 0 = A state assembly is ruled by the same political
party that ruled in that state prior to the election 1 =
A state assembly is ruled by a political party that is
different from the political party that ruled in that
state prior to the election
margin Percentage difference between the largest recipi-
ent of votes and the second largest recipient of
votes in all state assembly elections in India, 1980-
2000.
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B
B1. TSCS/Panel Data Regressions
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Table 13: Health Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.544∗∗ -0.544∗∗ -0.434∗ -0.402∗ -0.434∗ -0.421∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.209) (0.178) (0.166) (0.172) (0.0923)
left 0.462 0.462∗ 0.392∗ 0.375∗ 0.392 0.356∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.219) (0.191) (0.180) (0.241) (0.0877)
bjp 0.106 0.106 0.126 0.116 0.126 0.181∗
(0.250) (0.230) (0.206) (0.202) (0.216) (0.0827)
congress 0.218 0.218 0.169 0.160 0.169 0.0988
(0.204) (0.197) (0.172) (0.153) (0.176) (0.0573)
regional 0.261 0.261 0.231 0.192 0.231 0.127∗
(0.235) (0.198) (0.176) (0.188) (0.203) (0.0626)
coalitio 0.106 0.106 0.0673 0.0280 0.0673 -0.0377
(0.178) (0.181) (0.160) (0.140) (0.154) (0.0542)
election -0.583∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.527∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.154) (0.154) (0.149) (0.144) (0.0564)
effectvt -0.0930 -0.0930 -0.0653 -0.0648 -0.0653 -0.0248
(0.0495) (0.0553) (0.0483) (0.0499) (0.0425) (0.0194)
margin 0.00214 0.00214 0.00124 -0.000698 0.00124 0.00134
(0.00717) (0.00888) (0.00755) (0.00644) (0.00616) (0.00257)
alternat 0.109 0.109 0.114 0.137 0.114 0.126∗
(0.128) (0.159) (0.142) (0.128) (0.111) (0.0493)
L.health 0.758∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0589) (0.0536) (0.0493) (0.0294) (0.0237)
Constant 6.324∗∗∗ 6.324∗∗ 4.995∗∗ 4.737∗∗ 4.995∗∗ 4.648∗∗∗
(1.891) (2.058) (1.765) (1.681) (1.617) (0.908)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.749 0.749 0.792 0.859
chi2 925.6 476.5 608.4 603.6 1324.9 2501.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 14: Health Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.453∗ -0.453∗ -0.363∗ -0.318∗ -0.363∗ -0.400∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.206) (0.173) (0.155) (0.165) (0.0810)
left 0.436 0.436∗ 0.367 0.345 0.367 0.347∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.218) (0.188) (0.179) (0.243) (0.0853)
bjp 0.118 0.118 0.137 0.123 0.137 0.202∗
(0.252) (0.230) (0.203) (0.202) (0.214) (0.0822)
congress 0.203 0.203 0.153 0.135 0.153 0.0933
(0.206) (0.202) (0.173) (0.158) (0.176) (0.0566)
regional 0.185 0.185 0.174 0.129 0.174 0.103
(0.233) (0.201) (0.176) (0.196) (0.198) (0.0555)
coalitio 0.0237 0.0237 -0.00218 -0.0428 -0.00218 -0.0582
(0.200) (0.193) (0.170) (0.157) (0.172) (0.0545)
election -0.593∗∗∗ -0.593∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.156) (0.156) (0.151) (0.145) (0.0538)
effectst -0.0435 -0.0435 -0.0256 -0.0237 -0.0256 -0.00950
(0.0735) (0.0742) (0.0634) (0.0624) (0.0625) (0.0220)
margin 0.00123 0.00123 0.000525 -0.000826 0.000525 0.000943
(0.00721) (0.00905) (0.00758) (0.00646) (0.00611) (0.00257)
alternat 0.0962 0.0962 0.106 0.117 0.106 0.134∗∗
(0.129) (0.160) (0.142) (0.130) (0.111) (0.0465)
L.health 0.779∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0570) (0.0516) (0.0468) (0.0273) (0.0214)
Constant 5.178∗∗ 5.178∗∗ 4.099∗ 3.709∗ 4.099∗∗ 4.308∗∗∗
(1.788) (1.922) (1.623) (1.450) (1.506) (0.768)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.746 0.746 0.794 0.858
chi2 913.1 456.8 602.9 578.1 1346.9 2905.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 15: Health Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.498 0.194 0.599 0.345
(0.504) (0.170) (0.428) (0.179)
bjp -0.399 -0.0493 -0.199 0.123
(0.516) (0.182) (0.494) (0.202)
congress 0.147 0.0323 0.146 0.135
(0.337) (0.151) (0.339) (0.158)
regional -0.413 -0.0133 -0.369 0.129
(0.447) (0.199) (0.425) (0.196)
coalitio -0.0895 -0.0236 -0.0373 -0.0428
(0.335) (0.157) (0.315) (0.157)
election -0.301∗ -0.550∗∗∗ -0.334∗ -0.538∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.153) (0.146) (0.151)
effectst -0.233 -0.0157 -0.214 -0.0237
(0.171) (0.0629) (0.149) (0.0624)
margin 0.00919 -0.000224 0.00409 -0.000826
(0.0149) (0.00636) (0.0145) (0.00646)
alternat 0.383 0.0752 0.374 0.117
(0.260) (0.124) (0.252) (0.130)
L.health 0.844∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0445) (0.0468)
lnpcsgdp -2.943∗∗∗ -0.318∗
(0.824) (0.155)
Constant 7.231∗∗∗ 0.867∗ 33.20∗∗∗ 3.709∗
(0.861) (0.395) (7.206) (1.450)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.562 0.857 0.586 0.858
chi2 15.38 487.1 29.76 578.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 16: Health Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.458 0.188 0.833 0.375∗
(0.510) (0.175) (0.443) (0.180)
bjp -0.392 -0.0745 0.106 0.116
(0.505) (0.189) (0.460) (0.202)
congress 0.169 0.0319 0.383 0.160
(0.315) (0.152) (0.307) (0.153)
regional -0.165 -0.00107 0.283 0.192
(0.413) (0.199) (0.384) (0.188)
coalitio -0.0948 0.0131 0.0186 0.0280
(0.291) (0.141) (0.276) (0.140)
election -0.246 -0.549∗∗∗ -0.272 -0.527∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.152) (0.141) (0.149)
effectvt -0.472∗∗∗ -0.0319 -0.535∗∗∗ -0.0648
(0.122) (0.0468) (0.110) (0.0499)
margin 0.00532 0.0000957 -0.000415 -0.000698
(0.0140) (0.00630) (0.0132) (0.00644)
alternat 0.476∗ 0.0748 0.463∗ 0.137
(0.238) (0.120) (0.234) (0.128)
L.health 0.837∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0493)
lnpcsgdp -2.998∗∗∗ -0.402∗
(0.711) (0.166)
Constant 8.608∗∗∗ 0.997∗ 34.94∗∗∗ 4.737∗∗
(0.877) (0.465) (6.294) (1.681)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.627 0.856 0.664 0.859
chi2 31.28 489.8 47.43 603.6
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 17: Health Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hth regar1 Hth regar2 Hth regar3 Hth regar4
lnpcsgdp -3.593∗∗∗ -2.800∗∗∗ -3.222∗∗∗ -2.753∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.771) (0.494) (0.523)
left 0.366 0.288 0.689 0.611
(0.655) (0.652) (0.560) (0.579)
bjp -0.0109 -0.147 -0.0738 -0.136
(0.471) (0.477) (0.469) (0.481)
congress 0.238 0.167 0.391 0.357
(0.350) (0.355) (0.353) (0.361)
regional -0.489 -0.679 0.00373 -0.233
(0.484) (0.488) (0.457) (0.467)
election -0.251∗ -0.305∗∗ -0.298∗ -0.353∗∗
(0.113) (0.110) (0.122) (0.120)
coalitio -0.0479 0.0258 0.0558 -0.0243
(0.283) (0.311) (0.293) (0.329)
effectvt -0.429∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.107)
margin -0.00475 -0.00113 0.000649 0.00205
(0.0130) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0139)
alternat 0.691∗∗ 0.550∗ 0.483∗ 0.365
(0.216) (0.216) (0.215) (0.218)
effectst -0.145 -0.207
(0.191) (0.164)
Constant 39.39∗∗∗ 30.95∗∗∗ 36.73∗∗∗ 31.26∗∗∗
(2.314) (2.139) (4.376) (4.631)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 89.25 52.35
F 5.880 3.317
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 18: Irrigation Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp 0.0926 0.0926 0.126 0.0678 0.126 0.220
(0.297) (0.325) (0.334) (0.326) (0.300) (0.125)
left -0.488 -0.488 -0.550 -0.491 -0.550 -0.481∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.453) (0.464) (0.464) (0.455) (0.0826)
bjp -0.0566 -0.0566 -0.0636 0.0546 -0.0636 0.0806
(0.389) (0.388) (0.399) (0.387) (0.392) (0.0874)
congress -0.375 -0.375 -0.422 -0.378 -0.422 -0.316∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.363) (0.373) (0.348) (0.330) (0.0945)
regional -0.559 -0.559 -0.612 -0.561 -0.612 -0.663∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.451) (0.463) (0.429) (0.393) (0.0922)
coalitio -0.336 -0.336 -0.359 -0.403 -0.359 -0.349∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.305) (0.310) (0.306) (0.280) (0.0451)
election 0.558∗ 0.558∗ 0.543∗ 0.574∗∗ 0.543∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.233) (0.231) (0.200) (0.218) (0.0461)
effectvt -0.0300 -0.0300 -0.0273 -0.0436 -0.0273 0.00935
(0.0714) (0.0635) (0.0653) (0.0632) (0.0721) (0.0182)
margin 0.0189 0.0189 0.0192 0.0220 0.0192 0.0195∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0137) (0.0111) (0.00250)
alternat -0.150 -0.150 -0.152 -0.0409 -0.152 -0.308∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.210) (0.216) (0.220) (0.199) (0.0682)
L.irrigation 0.842∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0488) (0.0503) (0.0524) (0.0322) (0.0186)
Constant 0.253 0.253 0.0470 0.541 0.0470 -1.075
(2.546) (2.899) (2.982) (2.801) (2.573) (1.116)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.771 0.771 0.757 0.818
chi2 1047.9 640.9 594.4 750.8 1009.6 13689.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 19: Irrigation Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp 0.106 0.106 0.138 0.0985 0.138 0.191
(0.296) (0.317) (0.325) (0.326) (0.298) (0.121)
left -0.441 -0.441 -0.505 -0.446 -0.505 -0.433∗∗∗
(0.457) (0.460) (0.471) (0.461) (0.461) (0.0901)
bjp -0.0450 -0.0450 -0.0529 0.0757 -0.0529 0.0843
(0.389) (0.385) (0.395) (0.382) (0.392) (0.0979)
congress -0.355 -0.355 -0.403 -0.341 -0.403 -0.294∗∗
(0.329) (0.368) (0.377) (0.353) (0.331) (0.0992)
regional -0.558 -0.558 -0.609 -0.566 -0.609 -0.601∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.449) (0.460) (0.425) (0.390) (0.0899)
coalitio -0.261 -0.261 -0.285 -0.297 -0.285 -0.281∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.340) (0.346) (0.341) (0.315) (0.0469)
election 0.556∗ 0.556∗ 0.541∗ 0.573∗∗ 0.541∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.234) (0.232) (0.201) (0.218) (0.0448)
effectst -0.0751 -0.0751 -0.0716 -0.106 -0.0716 -0.0389
(0.112) (0.0899) (0.0918) (0.101) (0.113) (0.0213)
margin 0.0184 0.0184 0.0186 0.0209 0.0186 0.0191∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0138) (0.0111) (0.00255)
alternat -0.145 -0.145 -0.147 -0.0312 -0.147 -0.254∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.211) (0.216) (0.221) (0.199) (0.0753)
L.irrigation 0.843∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0487) (0.0502) (0.0526) (0.0321) (0.0176)
Constant 0.175 0.175 -0.0162 0.336 -0.0162 -0.716
(2.500) (2.787) (2.865) (2.758) (2.525) (1.066)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.771 0.771 0.757 0.820
chi2 1049.1 640.7 594.9 759.8 1011.7 12817.9
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 20: Irrigation Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left -1.871∗∗ -0.403 -2.119∗∗∗ -0.446
(0.625) (0.451) (0.610) (0.461)
bjp 0.322 0.104 -0.159 0.0757
(0.689) (0.402) (0.670) (0.382)
congress -1.465∗ -0.318 -1.746∗∗ -0.341
(0.585) (0.356) (0.561) (0.353)
regional -0.815 -0.519 -1.320 -0.566
(0.718) (0.414) (0.728) (0.425)
coalitio -0.974∗ -0.306 -0.897∗ -0.297
(0.431) (0.341) (0.432) (0.341)
election 0.127 0.575∗∗ 0.132 0.573∗∗
(0.162) (0.201) (0.163) (0.201)
effectst 0.121 -0.101 0.0636 -0.106
(0.191) (0.100) (0.193) (0.101)
margin 0.0349 0.0205 0.0376 0.0209
(0.0203) (0.0138) (0.0200) (0.0138)
alternat -0.255 -0.0176 -0.223 -0.0312
(0.362) (0.208) (0.366) (0.221)
L.irrigation 0.837∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.0502) (0.0526)
lnpcsgdp 1.832∗ 0.0985
(0.912) (0.326)
Constant 5.552∗∗∗ 1.132 -10.18 0.336
(0.921) (0.613) (8.057) (2.758)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.161 0.820 0.201 0.820
chi2 20.16 751.6 23.68 759.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 21: Irrigation Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left -1.855∗∗ -0.458 -2.099∗∗∗ -0.491
(0.627) (0.456) (0.611) (0.464)
bjp 0.286 0.0759 -0.205 0.0546
(0.687) (0.409) (0.663) (0.387)
congress -1.460∗ -0.359 -1.753∗∗ -0.378
(0.583) (0.350) (0.558) (0.348)
regional -0.932 -0.525 -1.411 -0.561
(0.708) (0.416) (0.724) (0.429)
coalitio -0.956∗ -0.403 -0.921∗ -0.403
(0.408) (0.306) (0.407) (0.306)
election 0.104 0.575∗∗ 0.111 0.574∗∗
(0.161) (0.200) (0.161) (0.200)
effectvt 0.228 -0.0434 0.216 -0.0436
(0.146) (0.0630) (0.139) (0.0632)
margin 0.0363 0.0217 0.0405∗ 0.0220
(0.0201) (0.0137) (0.0198) (0.0137)
alternat -0.295 -0.0317 -0.282 -0.0409
(0.374) (0.207) (0.375) (0.220)
L.irrigation 0.836∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗
(0.0504) (0.0524)
lnpcsgdp 1.873∗ 0.0678
(0.916) (0.326)
Constant 4.950∗∗∗ 1.094 -11.20 0.541
(0.961) (0.631) (8.126) (2.801)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.161 0.819 0.205 0.818
chi2 24.79 744.8 27.08 750.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 22: Irrigation Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Irr regar1 Irr regar2 Irr regar3 Irr regar4
lnpcsgdp -1.391 -1.334 0.721 0.780
(1.093) (1.101) (0.831) (0.833)
left -1.358 -1.287 -1.419 -1.429
(0.934) (0.944) (0.823) (0.832)
bjp -0.371 -0.199 -0.0549 0.0307
(0.686) (0.689) (0.661) (0.664)
congress -1.486∗∗ -1.385∗∗ -1.480∗∗ -1.448∗∗
(0.507) (0.512) (0.489) (0.494)
regional -0.765 -0.590 -0.894 -0.794
(0.702) (0.705) (0.663) (0.666)
election 0.0635 0.110 0.0888 0.126
(0.159) (0.159) (0.161) (0.161)
coalitio -0.900∗ -1.018∗ -0.966∗ -1.011∗
(0.413) (0.449) (0.405) (0.444)
effectvt 0.461∗ 0.354∗
(0.188) (0.165)
margin 0.0422∗ 0.0362 0.0341 0.0306
(0.0191) (0.0197) (0.0186) (0.0190)
alternat -0.309 -0.155 -0.408 -0.296
(0.315) (0.311) (0.299) (0.296)
effectst 0.217 0.186
(0.275) (0.241)
Constant 16.29∗∗∗ 17.06∗∗∗ -2.130 -1.749
(3.088) (3.129) (7.351) (7.388)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 24.59 20.41
F 2.442 1.866
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 23: Agriculture Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.586 -0.586 -0.530 -0.699 -0.530 -0.445∗∗
(0.413) (0.501) (0.480) (0.495) (0.390) (0.144)
left 0.342 0.342 0.343 0.442 0.343 0.368∗
(0.591) (0.400) (0.383) (0.409) (0.559) (0.175)
bjp 0.237 0.237 0.238 0.310 0.238 0.303∗∗
(0.543) (0.398) (0.381) (0.386) (0.514) (0.111)
congress 0.383 0.383 0.353 0.399 0.353 0.317∗∗∗
(0.445) (0.310) (0.296) (0.302) (0.422) (0.0902)
regional 0.357 0.357 0.340 0.392 0.340 0.359∗∗∗
(0.503) (0.354) (0.338) (0.348) (0.476) (0.101)
coalitio 0.380 0.380 0.355 0.460 0.355 0.370∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.361) (0.347) (0.348) (0.364) (0.0849)
election -0.609 -0.609 -0.604 -0.528 -0.604 -0.435∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.393) (0.396) (0.388) (0.311) (0.0747)
effectvt -0.207∗ -0.207∗ -0.190∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.190 -0.160∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.0907) (0.0865) (0.0879) (0.0986) (0.0277)
margin 0.0174 0.0174 0.0167 0.0169 0.0167 0.0152∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0148) (0.00348)
alternat 0.788∗∗ 0.788 0.757 0.915∗ 0.757∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.277) (0.405) (0.393) (0.400) (0.263) (0.0869)
L.agriculture 0.803∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗
(0.0308) (0.0640) (0.0617) (0.0598) (0.0292) (0.0193)
Constant 6.466 6.466 5.832 7.307 5.832 4.799∗∗∗
(3.740) (4.669) (4.473) (4.576) (3.527) (1.350)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.767 0.767 0.780 0.823
chi2 1024.1 235.3 255.8 258.7 1165.3 3581.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 24: Agriculture Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled OLS iid Pooled OLS cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.445 -0.445 -0.386 -0.475 -0.386 -0.361∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.487) (0.461) (0.465) (0.379) (0.106)
left 0.454 0.454 0.448 0.528 0.448 0.567∗∗∗
(0.602) (0.407) (0.383) (0.415) (0.562) (0.143)
bjp 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.336 0.274 0.397∗∗∗
(0.545) (0.404) (0.380) (0.387) (0.510) (0.0833)
congress 0.391 0.391 0.352 0.361 0.352 0.379∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.310) (0.291) (0.298) (0.420) (0.0731)
regional 0.253 0.253 0.243 0.250 0.243 0.328∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.337) (0.315) (0.323) (0.467) (0.0825)
coalitio 0.391 0.391 0.360 0.443 0.360 0.376∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.397) (0.376) (0.386) (0.407) (0.0600)
election -0.624∗ -0.624 -0.614 -0.547 -0.614∗ -0.569∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.397) (0.401) (0.395) (0.313) (0.0497)
effectst -0.215 -0.215 -0.195 -0.228 -0.195 -0.178∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.119) (0.113) (0.118) (0.148) (0.0296)
margin 0.0149 0.0149 0.0141 0.0147 0.0141 0.0125∗∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0146) (0.00229)
alternat 0.772∗∗ 0.772 0.735 0.839∗ 0.735∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.412) (0.396) (0.405) (0.261) (0.0595)
L.agriculture 0.816∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.0298) (0.0653) (0.0621) (0.0607) (0.0279) (0.0170)
Constant 4.847 4.847 4.192 4.895 4.192 3.707∗∗∗
(3.608) (4.440) (4.198) (4.191) (3.355) (0.996)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.765 0.765 0.784 0.821
chi2 1015.2 257.0 288.1 300.3 1193.2 7340.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 25: Agriculture Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left -0.0898 0.394 -0.0483 0.528
(0.940) (0.421) (0.881) (0.415)
bjp 0.383 0.173 0.483 0.336
(0.941) (0.390) (0.984) (0.387)
congress 1.078 0.268 0.888 0.361
(0.693) (0.297) (0.697) (0.298)
regional -0.0927 0.0667 0.115 0.250
(0.803) (0.339) (0.804) (0.323)
coalitio 0.336 0.461 0.417 0.443
(0.633) (0.383) (0.606) (0.386)
election -0.338 -0.545 -0.348 -0.547
(0.316) (0.399) (0.312) (0.395)
effectst -0.579∗ -0.212 -0.549∗ -0.228
(0.234) (0.121) (0.219) (0.118)
margin 0.0321 0.0174 0.0314 0.0147
(0.0255) (0.0118) (0.0247) (0.0117)
alternat 2.082∗∗∗ 0.747 2.089∗∗∗ 0.839∗
(0.608) (0.395) (0.587) (0.405)
L.agriculture 0.841∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗
(0.0616) (0.0607)
lnpcsgdp -4.440∗ -0.475
(1.907) (0.465)
Constant 9.769∗∗∗ 0.723 48.52∗∗ 4.895
(1.740) (0.828) (16.73) (4.191)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.476 0.823 0.501 0.821
chi2 25.31 294.7 30.05 300.3
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 26: Agriculture Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.262 0.246 0.519 0.442
(0.877) (0.410) (0.833) (0.409)
bjp 0.753 0.0849 0.939 0.310
(0.882) (0.392) (0.920) (0.386)
congress 1.356∗ 0.246 1.287 0.399
(0.676) (0.292) (0.680) (0.302)
regional 0.424 0.0902 0.831 0.392
(0.798) (0.344) (0.790) (0.348)
coalitio 0.296 0.445 0.360 0.460
(0.553) (0.350) (0.538) (0.348)
election -0.244 -0.533 -0.242 -0.528
(0.293) (0.396) (0.288) (0.388)
effectvt -1.053∗∗∗ -0.187∗ -1.132∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗
(0.229) (0.0797) (0.231) (0.0879)
margin 0.0195 0.0204 0.0170 0.0169
(0.0251) (0.0120) (0.0244) (0.0117)
alternat 2.329∗∗∗ 0.761 2.457∗∗∗ 0.915∗
(0.580) (0.389) (0.561) (0.400)
L.agriculture 0.831∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.0598)
lnpcsgdp -4.855∗∗ -0.699
(1.626) (0.495)
Constant 12.59∗∗∗ 1.021 55.30∗∗∗ 7.307
(1.788) (0.775) (14.91) (4.576)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.507 0.824 0.545 0.823
chi2 40.63 248.6 42.33 258.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 27: Agriculture Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agr regar1 Agr regar2 Agr regar3 Agr regar4
lnpcsgdp -5.368∗∗∗ -3.808∗ -7.252∗∗∗ -6.290∗∗∗
(1.470) (1.626) (1.162) (1.245)
left 0.644 0.580 0.389 0.416
(1.319) (1.315) (1.189) (1.222)
bjp 0.421 -0.0328 0.495 0.135
(0.956) (0.973) (0.954) (0.985)
congress 0.813 0.534 0.954 0.798
(0.709) (0.722) (0.708) (0.731)
regional -0.458 -1.011 -0.383 -0.900
(0.982) (0.993) (0.956) (0.981)
election -0.133 -0.271 -0.186 -0.328
(0.226) (0.221) (0.237) (0.234)
coalitio 0.434 0.864 0.360 0.577
(0.575) (0.634) (0.585) (0.659)
effectvt -1.070∗∗∗ -1.231∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.234)
margin 0.0149 0.0171 0.0222 0.0258
(0.0265) (0.0279) (0.0267) (0.0283)
alternat 2.751∗∗∗ 2.464∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗∗ 2.330∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.439) (0.431) (0.440)
effectst -0.653 -0.688
(0.390) (0.356)
Constant 58.21∗∗∗ 41.64∗∗∗ 76.43∗∗∗ 65.14∗∗∗
(4.554) (4.111) (10.27) (11.04)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 110.3 66.75
F 6.820 4.520
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 28: Social Expenditure Regressions-Different Error Processes1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.122 -0.122 -0.130 -0.207 -0.130 -0.0698
(0.215) (0.222) (0.224) (0.210) (0.213) (0.0395)
left -0.289 -0.289 -0.286 -0.144 -0.286 -0.254∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.178) (0.179) (0.202) (0.304) (0.0362)
bjp -0.552 -0.552∗∗ -0.555∗∗ -0.430∗ -0.555∗ -0.509∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.197) (0.199) (0.177) (0.282) (0.0446)
congress -0.451∗ -0.451∗ -0.451∗ -0.333 -0.451∗ -0.409∗∗∗
(0.228) (0.180) (0.182) (0.174) (0.225) (0.0353)
regional -0.240 -0.240 -0.238 -0.171 -0.238 -0.170∗
(0.260) (0.262) (0.264) (0.277) (0.258) (0.0760)
coalitio 0.0877 0.0877 0.0885 0.123 0.0885 0.0854∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.183) (0.184) (0.196) (0.196) (0.0205)
election -0.228 -0.228 -0.227 -0.225 -0.227 -0.222∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.177) (0.177) (0.171) (0.159) (0.0138)
effectvt -0.0542 -0.0542 -0.0555 -0.0834 -0.0555 -0.0521∗∗∗
(0.0520) (0.0558) (0.0563) (0.0546) (0.0515) (0.00977)
margin 0.00593 0.00593 0.00612 0.00570 0.00612 0.00715∗∗∗
(0.00796) (0.00913) (0.00921) (0.00873) (0.00788) (0.00165)
alternat 0.273 0.273 0.278 0.255 0.278 0.245∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.181) (0.182) (0.172) (0.142) (0.0197)
L.socialse 0.715∗∗∗ 0.715∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0786) (0.0791) (0.0818) (0.0361) (0.0146)
Constant 2.034 2.034 2.116 2.827 2.116 1.488∗∗∗
(1.921) (2.069) (2.089) (1.964) (1.903) (0.363)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.617 0.617 0.612 0.625
chi2 501.6 340.0 331.9 356.9 508.5 5784.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 29: Social Expenditure Regressions-Different Error Processes2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reg iid Reg cor Reg AR1 cor Reg AR1 psarcor FGLSAR1 FGLSCAR
lnpcsgdp -0.0900 -0.0900 -0.104 -0.156 -0.104 -0.0425
(0.213) (0.216) (0.219) (0.212) (0.213) (0.0381)
left -0.274 -0.274 -0.268 -0.107 -0.268 -0.240∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.176) (0.179) (0.203) (0.311) (0.0361)
bjp -0.539 -0.539∗∗ -0.545∗∗ -0.403∗ -0.545 -0.495∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.198) (0.201) (0.188) (0.284) (0.0426)
congress -0.447 -0.447∗ -0.448∗ -0.304 -0.448∗ -0.400∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.179) (0.182) (0.180) (0.228) (0.0336)
regional -0.272 -0.272 -0.269 -0.184 -0.269 -0.202∗
(0.259) (0.249) (0.253) (0.280) (0.258) (0.0793)
coalitio 0.0524 0.0524 0.0517 0.0289 0.0517 0.0456∗
(0.225) (0.194) (0.197) (0.210) (0.224) (0.0219)
election -0.227 -0.227 -0.227 -0.225 -0.227 -0.222∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.178) (0.177) (0.171) (0.159) (0.0139)
effectst -0.0342 -0.0342 -0.0351 -0.0366 -0.0351 -0.0349∗∗
(0.0816) (0.0578) (0.0588) (0.0610) (0.0814) (0.0115)
margin 0.00574 0.00574 0.00610 0.00444 0.00610 0.00651∗∗∗
(0.00800) (0.00922) (0.00937) (0.00867) (0.00798) (0.00180)
alternat 0.264 0.264 0.272 0.252 0.272 0.238∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.182) (0.184) (0.175) (0.144) (0.0204)
L.socialse 0.719∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗
(0.0364) (0.0796) (0.0807) (0.0833) (0.0362) (0.0139)
Constant 1.625 1.625 1.760 2.118 1.760 1.153∗∗∗
(1.876) (1.934) (1.969) (1.876) (1.874) (0.342)
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
r2 0.616 0.616 0.607 0.619
chi2 499.3 334.2 319.1 328.4 495.3 6598.0
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 30: Social Expenditure Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left 0.0388 -0.163 0.0167 -0.107
(0.317) (0.167) (0.298) (0.203)
bjp -1.064∗∗∗ -0.489∗∗ -0.691∗ -0.403∗
(0.319) (0.166) (0.319) (0.188)
congress -0.731∗∗ -0.353∗ -0.654∗ -0.304
(0.272) (0.162) (0.270) (0.180)
regional -0.821 -0.261 -0.717 -0.184
(0.525) (0.247) (0.504) (0.280)
coalitio 0.303 0.0536 0.215 0.0289
(0.266) (0.200) (0.263) (0.210)
election -0.139 -0.227 -0.137 -0.225
(0.130) (0.171) (0.130) (0.171)
effectst -0.421∗∗ -0.0451 -0.329∗ -0.0366
(0.142) (0.0594) (0.129) (0.0610)
margin 0.0279 0.00448 0.0266 0.00444
(0.0147) (0.00869) (0.0147) (0.00867)
alternat 0.760∗∗ 0.236 0.733∗∗ 0.252
(0.284) (0.169) (0.276) (0.175)
L.socialse 0.722∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.0767) (0.0833)
lnpcsgdp -1.545∗∗ -0.156
(0.597) (0.212)
Constant 3.462∗∗∗ 0.801∗ 16.86∗∗ 2.118
(0.609) (0.342) (5.295) (1.876)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.207 0.621 0.226 0.619
chi2 27.66 278.3 32.59 328.4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B2. Quantile Regression Results-Figures
Figure 2: Behaviour of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of
Health expenditure
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Table 31: Social Expenditure Regressions-Per Capita SGDP and LDV 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reg AR1 psarcor Reg AR2 psarcor Reg AR3 psarcor Reg AR4 psarcor
left -0.0398 -0.223 0.0116 -0.144
(0.323) (0.166) (0.315) (0.202)
bjp -0.980∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗ -0.551 -0.430∗
(0.323) (0.157) (0.317) (0.177)
congress -0.683∗ -0.398∗ -0.614∗ -0.333
(0.276) (0.157) (0.272) (0.174)
regional -0.690 -0.277 -0.602 -0.171
(0.523) (0.243) (0.496) (0.277)
coalitio 0.149 0.126 0.148 0.123
(0.252) (0.196) (0.249) (0.196)
election -0.0938 -0.227 -0.0959 -0.225
(0.123) (0.171) (0.122) (0.171)
effectvt -0.443∗∗∗ -0.0757 -0.452∗∗∗ -0.0834
(0.123) (0.0532) (0.121) (0.0546)
margin 0.0275∗ 0.00565 0.0271 0.00570
(0.0140) (0.00875) (0.0140) (0.00873)
alternat 0.859∗∗ 0.232 0.836∗∗ 0.255
(0.280) (0.166) (0.271) (0.172)
L.socialse 0.716∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.0750) (0.0818)
lnpcsgdp -1.595∗∗ -0.207
(0.521) (0.210)
Constant 4.083∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗ 18.14∗∗∗ 2.827
(0.694) (0.373) (4.765) (1.964)
Observations 340 323 340 323
r2 0.234 0.626 0.259 0.625
chi2 28.43 291.2 34.84 356.9
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 32: Social Expendtiure Regressions-Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Soc regar1 Soc regar2 Soc regar3 Soc regar4
lnpcsgdp 0.0230 -0.132 -1.422∗∗ -1.295∗
(0.880) (0.887) (0.540) (0.534)
left 0.130 0.0932 -0.0151 0.0241
(0.673) (0.692) (0.570) (0.582)
bjp -0.193 -0.473 -0.713 -0.837
(0.506) (0.516) (0.481) (0.488)
congress -0.407 -0.593 -0.626 -0.673
(0.372) (0.383) (0.359) (0.366)
regional -0.297 -0.560 -0.455 -0.610
(0.515) (0.526) (0.466) (0.470)
election -0.0570 -0.126 -0.0972 -0.146
(0.113) (0.116) (0.117) (0.119)
coalitio -0.000609 0.370 0.138 0.265
(0.305) (0.337) (0.299) (0.334)
effectvt -0.699∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.114)
margin 0.0136 0.0157 0.0247 0.0256
(0.0143) (0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0142)
alternat 1.010∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.233) (0.221) (0.222)
effectst -0.631∗∗ -0.382∗
(0.207) (0.166)
Constant 4.345∗ 4.621∗ 16.78∗∗∗ 14.85∗∗
(1.956) (2.071) (4.808) (4.725)
Observations 323 323 340 340
r2
Wald
chi2 48.15 35.87
F 4.367 2.702
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 3: Behaviour of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of
Agricultural expenditure
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Figure 4: Behaviour of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of
Irrigation expenditure
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Figure 5: Behaviour of coefficients on regressors across quantiles for Quantile Regression of
Social expenditure
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B3. Quantile Regression Results-Tables
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Table 33: Health Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hth OLS hth qreg 25 hth qreg 50 hth qreg 75 hth bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -2.560∗∗∗ -1.739∗∗∗ -1.979∗∗∗ -3.577∗∗∗ -1.979∗∗∗
(-8.55) (-5.35) (-6.34) (-7.65) (-6.19)
left 1.951∗∗∗ 2.198∗∗∗ 1.826∗∗∗ 2.305∗∗ 1.826∗∗∗
(4.35) (4.72) (3.86) (3.16) (4.24)
bjp -0.0411 0.375 0.115 0.239 0.115
(-0.10) (0.87) (0.26) (0.37) (0.39)
congress 0.869∗∗ 0.550 0.767∗ 1.332∗ 0.767∗
(2.60) (1.49) (2.16) (2.59) (2.11)
regional 1.270∗∗ 0.682 1.166∗∗ 1.911∗∗ 1.166∗∗
(3.32) (1.69) (2.89) (3.18) (3.00)
election -0.235 0.0826 -0.0750 -0.416 -0.0750
(-0.97) (0.32) (-0.29) (-1.10) (-0.38)
coalitio 0.705∗ -0.170 0.303 0.885 0.303
(2.38) (-0.58) (0.96) (1.93) (1.03)
effectvt -0.565∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗
(-7.40) (-5.06) (-4.16) (-5.08) (-3.44)
margin 0.0277∗ 0.0264 0.00793 0.0125 0.00793
(2.35) (1.68) (0.64) (0.75) (0.46)
alternat -0.00453 0.0456 -0.147 -0.0488 -0.147
(-0.02) (0.21) (-0.67) (-0.14) (-0.63)
Constant 30.18∗∗∗ 21.28∗∗∗ 24.24∗∗∗ 40.51∗∗∗ 24.24∗∗∗
(11.47) (7.38) (8.83) (9.75) (8.22)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 34: Health Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
hth psarcor hth qreg 25 hth qreg 50 hth qreg 75 hth bsqreg 50
left 0.194 2.271∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗ 1.764 2.179∗∗∗
(1.14) (4.65) (4.77) (1.90) (4.42)
bjp -0.0493 0.626 0.112 0.550 0.112
(-0.27) (1.39) (0.27) (0.67) (0.31)
congress 0.0323 0.751∗ 0.658 1.338∗ 0.658
(0.21) (2.05) (1.94) (2.06) (1.72)
regional -0.0133 0.686 0.896∗ 1.421 0.896∗
(-0.07) (1.70) (2.33) (1.88) (2.22)
coalitio -0.0236 -0.565 0.0350 0.262 0.0350
(-0.15) (-1.64) (0.10) (0.37) (0.08)
election -0.550∗∗∗ -0.0325 -0.0468 -0.312 -0.0468
(-3.60) (-0.12) (-0.19) (-0.65) (-0.25)
effectst -0.0157 -0.148 -0.162 -0.224 -0.162
(-0.25) (-1.46) (-1.37) (-0.77) (-1.19)
margin -0.000224 0.0241 0.0127 0.0326 0.0127
(-0.04) (1.50) (1.06) (1.51) (0.86)
alternat 0.0752 -0.148 -0.130 -0.213 -0.130
(0.61) (-0.64) (-0.62) (-0.49) (-0.63)
L.health 0.844∗∗∗
(18.97)
lnpcsgdp -1.485∗∗∗ -1.934∗∗∗ -3.698∗∗∗ -1.934∗∗∗
(-4.18) (-6.47) (-6.75) (-6.91)
Constant 0.867∗ 18.01∗∗∗ 22.88∗∗∗ 39.50∗∗∗ 22.88∗∗∗
(2.20) (5.76) (8.83) (8.28) (9.35)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 35: Irrigation Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Irr OLS Irr qreg 25 Irr qreg 50 Irr qreg 75 Irr bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp 2.557∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗∗ 1.751∗
(5.23) (4.67) (4.01) (6.76) (2.01)
left -4.453∗∗∗ -3.105∗∗∗ -4.218∗∗∗ -5.033∗∗∗ -4.218∗∗∗
(-6.07) (-8.16) (-6.55) (-7.79) (-5.20)
bjp -0.418 0.517 1.379∗ 0.129 1.379
(-0.61) (1.50) (2.28) (0.21) (1.65)
congress -2.823∗∗∗ -3.335∗∗∗ -3.100∗∗∗ -1.527∗∗ -3.100∗∗∗
(-5.16) (-12.52) (-6.43) (-3.03) (-4.53)
regional -4.568∗∗∗ -3.773∗∗∗ -4.671∗∗∗ -4.546∗∗∗ -4.671∗∗∗
(-7.29) (-12.61) (-8.41) (-7.41) (-5.32)
election 0.246 0.222 0.693 0.581 0.693
(0.62) (1.11) (1.95) (1.60) (1.57)
coalitio -1.644∗∗∗ -2.297∗∗∗ -2.488∗∗∗ -0.548 -2.488∗∗∗
(-3.40) (-9.68) (-5.80) (-1.23) (-3.36)
effectvt -0.00943 0.118 0.0243 -0.302∗∗ 0.0243
(-0.08) (1.75) (0.22) (-2.76) (0.11)
margin 0.0278 0.0232∗∗ -0.0113 -0.0224 -0.0113
(1.44) (2.76) (-0.65) (-1.17) (-0.41)
alternat -0.158 -0.634∗∗∗ 0.294 0.300 0.294
(-0.46) (-3.58) (0.97) (0.98) (0.61)
Constant -14.78∗∗∗ -5.026∗ -7.976∗ -17.37∗∗∗ -7.976
(-3.43) (-2.29) (-2.08) (-4.20) (-1.03)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 36: Irrigation Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Irr psarcor Irr qreg 25 Irr qreg 50 Irr qreg 75 Irr bsqreg 50
left -0.403 -3.152∗∗∗ -3.843∗∗∗ -5.021∗∗∗ -3.843∗∗∗
(-0.89) (-7.80) (-4.50) (-7.61) (-4.38)
bjp 0.104 0.488 1.444 0.0692 1.444
(0.26) (1.35) (1.85) (0.11) (1.65)
congress -0.318 -3.377∗∗∗ -3.110∗∗∗ -1.930∗∗∗ -3.110∗∗∗
(-0.89) (-12.23) (-4.93) (-3.91) (-4.65)
regional -0.519 -3.615∗∗∗ -4.347∗∗∗ -4.635∗∗∗ -4.347∗∗∗
(-1.25) (-11.93) (-6.09) (-7.77) (-5.78)
coalitio -0.306 -2.314∗∗∗ -1.820∗∗ -0.514 -1.820∗
(-0.90) (-8.29) (-2.89) (-1.02) (-2.03)
election 0.575∗∗ 0.246 0.214 0.465 0.214
(2.87) (1.17) (0.47) (1.29) (0.49)
effectst -0.101 0.178 -0.287 -0.365∗ -0.287
(-1.01) (1.77) (-1.30) (-2.21) (-0.99)
margin 0.0205 0.0166 -0.00977 -0.0174 -0.00977
(1.48) (1.81) (-0.43) (-0.93) (-0.36)
alternat -0.0176 -0.484∗ 0.447 0.181 0.447
(-0.08) (-2.55) (1.13) (0.61) (0.91)
L.irrigation 0.837∗∗∗
(16.67)
lnpcsgdp 1.057∗∗∗ 1.881∗∗∗ 3.399∗∗∗ 1.881∗
(3.96) (3.33) (7.69) (2.23)
Constant 1.132 -3.930 -8.653 -19.77∗∗∗ -8.653
(1.85) (-1.72) (-1.76) (-5.09) (-1.18)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 37: Agriculture Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agr OLS Agr qreg 25 Agr qreg 50 Agr qreg 75 Agr bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -4.071∗∗∗ -2.136∗∗ -2.510∗∗∗ -5.842∗∗∗ -2.510∗
(-5.82) (-2.84) (-4.46) (-7.47) (-2.51)
left 0.457 1.381 0.0765 -0.699 0.0765
(0.44) (1.38) (0.09) (-0.59) (0.10)
bjp 0.394 -0.0675 -1.082 2.436∗ -1.082
(0.40) (-0.07) (-1.39) (2.20) (-0.85)
congress 2.356∗∗ 1.496 1.628∗∗ 1.715∗ 1.628∗
(3.01) (1.94) (2.62) (2.00) (2.39)
regional 1.725 0.944 0.113 -0.0906 0.113
(1.93) (1.05) (0.16) (-0.09) (0.15)
election 0.107 0.276 -0.119 0.109 -0.119
(0.19) (0.48) (-0.27) (0.17) (-0.22)
coalitio 1.283 0.370 -0.396 1.834∗ -0.396
(1.85) (0.57) (-0.73) (2.19) (-0.56)
effectvt -1.102∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗ -0.449∗∗ -0.838∗∗∗ -0.449∗
(-6.17) (-3.49) (-3.17) (-3.60) (-2.14)
margin 0.0883∗∗ 0.0506 0.150∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(3.20) (1.80) (6.92) (5.81) (6.90)
alternat 0.894 1.472∗∗ 0.239 0.658 0.239
(1.84) (3.15) (0.61) (1.18) (0.48)
Constant 46.36∗∗∗ 24.75∗∗∗ 30.30∗∗∗ 63.06∗∗∗ 30.30∗∗∗
(7.53) (3.69) (6.11) (9.01) (3.33)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 38: Agriculture Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Agr psarcor Agr qreg 25 Agr qreg 50 Agr qreg 75 Agr bsqreg 50
left 0.394 1.210 -0.152 -0.918 -0.152
(0.94) (1.07) (-0.17) (-0.78) (-0.18)
bjp 0.173 0.00839 -1.508 1.100 -1.508
(0.44) (0.01) (-1.80) (1.02) (-1.21)
congress 0.268 1.371 1.089 1.862∗ 1.089
(0.90) (1.67) (1.61) (2.25) (1.37)
regional 0.0667 0.890 -0.757 -1.135 -0.757
(0.20) (0.95) (-0.99) (-1.19) (-0.97)
coalitio 0.461 -0.965 -0.518 2.033∗ -0.518
(1.20) (-1.26) (-0.80) (2.28) (-0.87)
election -0.545 0.162 -0.0329 0.0626 -0.0329
(-1.36) (0.25) (-0.07) (0.10) (-0.06)
effectst -0.212 0.0311 -0.244 -0.759∗ -0.244
(-1.76) (0.12) (-1.05) (-2.09) (-0.91)
margin 0.0174 0.0613∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(1.48) (2.03) (6.50) (6.67) (6.33)
alternat 0.747 0.960 0.287 0.544 0.287
(1.89) (1.88) (0.68) (0.96) (0.61)
L.agriculture 0.841∗∗∗
(13.65)
lnpcsgdp -2.017∗ -2.089∗∗∗ -5.071∗∗∗ -2.089∗
(-2.33) (-3.47) (-6.86) (-2.11)
Constant 0.723 21.88∗∗ 25.80∗∗∗ 54.65∗∗∗ 25.80∗∗
(0.87) (2.88) (4.93) (8.46) (2.94)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 39: Social Expenditure Regressions-Various Quantiles 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Soc OLS Soc qreg 25 Soc qreg 50 Soc qreg 75 Soc bsqreg 50
lnpcsgdp -1.586∗∗∗ -0.0720 -0.721∗∗∗ -1.624∗∗∗ -0.721∗∗
(-5.21) (-0.76) (-5.00) (-4.24) (-3.15)
left -0.294 -0.535∗∗∗ -0.252 -1.458∗∗ -0.252
(-0.64) (-3.56) (-1.16) (-2.83) (-0.76)
bjp -1.386∗∗ -1.393∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗ -2.229∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗
(-3.27) (-9.68) (-4.80) (-4.95) (-2.94)
congress -0.532 -0.763∗∗∗ -0.359∗ -1.063∗∗ -0.359
(-1.57) (-6.65) (-2.23) (-2.87) (-1.19)
regional 0.0635 -0.675∗∗∗ -0.333 -0.397 -0.333
(0.16) (-5.26) (-1.81) (-0.90) (-0.95)
election -0.0824 0.0165 -0.0439 -0.246 -0.0439
(-0.33) (0.19) (-0.37) (-0.93) (-0.36)
coalitio -0.00127 0.160 0.160 -0.432 0.160
(-0.00) (1.41) (1.13) (-1.44) (0.68)
effectvt -0.169∗ -0.0132 -0.0312 -0.00897 -0.0312
(-2.17) (-0.45) (-0.85) (-0.10) (-0.45)
margin 0.0128 -0.00838 0.0141∗ 0.0323∗∗ 0.0141
(1.06) (-1.76) (2.48) (2.76) (1.48)
alternat 0.533∗ -0.00613 0.283∗∗ 0.656∗∗ 0.283
(2.52) (-0.09) (2.80) (2.62) (1.47)
Constant 17.18∗∗∗ 2.808∗∗∗ 8.442∗∗∗ 18.10∗∗∗ 8.442∗∗∗
(6.42) (3.37) (6.65) (5.44) (4.39)
Observations 340 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
SUB-NATIONAL SPENDING IN INDIA 66
Table 40: Social Expendtiure Regressions-Various Quantiles 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Soc psarcor Soc qreg 25 Soc qreg 50 Soc qreg 75 Soc bsqreg 50
left -0.163 -0.527∗∗ -0.470 -1.711∗∗ -0.470
(-0.98) (-3.03) (-1.69) (-3.21) (-1.43)
bjp -0.489∗∗ -1.288∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗∗ -2.215∗∗∗ -1.160∗∗∗
(-2.95) (-7.71) (-4.57) (-4.72) (-3.58)
congress -0.353∗ -0.685∗∗∗ -0.438∗ -0.909∗ -0.438
(-2.18) (-4.87) (-2.13) (-2.38) (-1.52)
regional -0.261 -0.607∗∗∗ -0.444 -0.498 -0.444
(-1.06) (-4.03) (-1.90) (-1.09) (-1.24)
coalitio 0.0536 0.0706 -0.0441 -0.701 -0.0441
(0.27) (0.48) (-0.22) (-1.91) (-0.18)
election -0.227 -0.0448 -0.0615 -0.133 -0.0615
(-1.33) (-0.45) (-0.42) (-0.49) (-0.52)
effectst -0.0451 0.0918∗ 0.0717 0.218 0.0717
(-0.76) (2.11) (0.99) (1.42) (0.70)
margin 0.00448 -0.00945 0.0138 0.0162 0.0138
(0.52) (-1.63) (1.90) (1.38) (1.31)
alternat 0.236 -0.0420 0.215 0.381 0.215
(1.39) (-0.51) (1.69) (1.51) (1.07)
L.socialse 0.722∗∗∗
(9.40)
lnpcsgdp -0.156 -0.624∗∗∗ -1.554∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗
(-1.37) (-3.44) (-4.08) (-2.64)
Constant 0.801∗ 3.283∗∗ 7.509∗∗∗ 17.12∗∗∗ 7.509∗∗∗
(2.34) (3.32) (4.77) (5.27) (3.80)
Observations 323 340 340 340 340
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
